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Despite NATO’s long history of close military cooperation and coordination, the Alliance 
cannot fully support major multinational operations. Tested by conflicts in the 1990s 
through to the recent war in Libya, NATO capabilities have consistently fallen short. 
During each conflict, intelligence played a key role in securing victory, but NATO’s 
operational successes were made possible only through substantial U.S. intelligence 
support. The lack of an independent NATO intelligence capability presents a problem for 
the United States, which needs a NATO capable of conducting operations in the event of 
a simultaneous conflict in another region.  
Given the rise of austerity measures in Europe, it is unlikely that European 
governments will provide additional funding to establish a comprehensive NATO 
intelligence capability. Therefore, the U.S. should establish an enhanced intelligence-
sharing relationship with NATO to offset the paucity of NATO intelligence support and 
operational resources. Intelligence sharing can increase international cooperation and 
allow for greater burden sharing among allies. This is most aptly demonstrated by the 
United Kingdom-U.S.A. (UKUSA) series of signals intelligence agreements developed 
during World War II, which arguably provided the foundation for the “special 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Despite NATO’s long history of close military cooperation and coordination, the 
Alliance cannot fully support major multinational operations. Tested by conflicts in the 
1990s through to the recent war in Libya, NATO capabilities have consistently fallen 
short. During each conflict intelligence played a key role in securing victory, but 
NATO’s operational successes were made possible only through substantial U.S. 
intelligence support. The Alliance has no independent ability to provide intelligence 
support to major NATO operations. This lack of an independent NATO intelligence 
capability presents a problem for the United States who needs a NATO capable of 
conducting operations in the event of a simultaneous conflict in another region.  
Given the rise of austerity measures in Europe, which are designed to reduce 
government spending, it is unlikely that European governments will provide additional 
funding to establish a comprehensive NATO intelligence capability. Therefore, the U.S. 
should establish an enhanced intelligence-sharing relationship with NATO to offset the 
paucity of NATO intelligence support and operational resources. The current U.S.–
NATO intelligence-sharing relationship, however, has major problems because it is 
largely focused on augmenting NATO operational intelligence support and capabilities 
only during times of crisis. This mode of intelligence cooperation has created a crisis-
sharing mindset where the U.S. provides additional intelligence support during major 
NATO operations, thus preventing the development of a comprehensive NATO 
intelligence support mechanism. No enduring framework exists for effective sharing 
outside of crisis so that NATO intelligence can independently support Alliance 
operations.  
Intelligence sharing can increase international cooperation and allow for greater 
burden sharing among allies. Military intelligence cooperatives are particularly well 
adapted for this circumstance. This is most aptly demonstrated by the United Kingdom-
U.S.A. (UKUSA) series of signals intelligence agreements developed during World War 
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II, which arguably provided the foundation for the “special relationship” between the 
U.S. and the U.K. today. 1 UKUSA has additional applicability here because during the 
two decades preceding their alliance in World War II, the Americans and the British were 
potent enough rivals that the U.S. conducted extensive war planning against the United 
Kingdom. Concerns over British intentions and trustworthiness during the initial phase of 
World War II echo contemporary U.S. concerns with NATO on information security and 
inter-alliance rivalries.  
The lack of a structurally sound intelligence-sharing policy may have a negative 
effect on U.S. foreign policy interests in Europe, Africa, and the Near East, particularly 
as America shifts focus to East Asia. Despite NATO’s longevity, it appears the U.S. 
intelligence-sharing relationship with NATO requires rebuilding so the U.S. and NATO 
can become even more reliable and effective foreign policy partners.  
This thesis will examine the following major research questions: Why is there a 
NATO intelligence capability gap? What do NATO’s post-Cold War conflicts tell us 
about the U.S.–NATO intelligence sharing relationship? And finally, what lessons can we 
draw from the U.S.’s most successful intelligence sharing-program, the UKUSA signals 
intelligence agreements, that are applicable here? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The subject of intelligence-sharing agreements is critically important for the U.S. 
and NATO because the United States provides the bulk of NATO’s intelligence 
capability because the Alliance never elected to create an operational intelligence support 
mechanism. Early in NATO’s history members saw intelligence as a tool for internal 
(NATO) political gain at the strategic level and this left the Alliance disinclined to 
develop operational intelligence support mechanisms or organizations. Wide recognition 
                                                
1 UKUSA is the most common term used to refer to American and British signals intelligence 
cooperation, but is not technically accurate. The term UKUSA was first used in the signals intelligence 
cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in 1951. A previous agreement in 1943, however, 
had no specific name, while subsequent agreements in 1946 and 1948 were titled “British—U.S.A 
Communications Intelligence Agreement” (BRUSA). For simplicity’s sake, and because of its common 
usage, generic references to U.S.–U.K. signals intelligence cooperation are referred to as UKUSA, unless 
otherwise specifically noted. Most often however, this thesis discusses the formation of the 1943 agreement 
between the U.S. War Department and the British Government Code and Cipher School. 
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of NATO’s inability to provide operational intelligence support was identified during the 
campaign in Bosnia, NATO’s first major “out of area” operation, and reiterated during 
operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya.2 During each conflict the U.S. and its 
NATO allies developed complex networks of intelligence sharing agreements and 
systems that have benefited all countries involved.  But that capability has been sorely 
tested in Afghanistan, where many experts argue that intelligence support to U.S. and 
allied troops has been inadequate.  U.S. ability to provide additional capabilities to 
support NATO contingency operations might be unavailable because ‘the pivot to the 
Asia-Pacific region,’ has prioritized operations in the Far East, which may have serious 
consequences stability and security in the NATO sphere of influence.3 
This thesis looks to these potential problems and examines the 1943 signals 
intelligence agreement between the U.S. War Department and the British Government 
Code and Cipher School (GCCS) which initiated the large UKUSA agreement series as a 
potent example of successful intelligence sharing that had salient effects on foreign 
policy. While historians at the National Security Agency (NSA) documented the origins 
of the 1943 UKUSA agreement, the NSA declassified an even wider array of primary 
source documents in June 2010. Before this release, many noted intelligence historians 
identified that it was the peacetime establishment of signals intelligence sharing that 
formed the foundations of the U.S.–U.K. special relationship. These newly released 
documents, however, reveal that the foundations for comprehensive intelligence sharing 
began with the agreement in 1943. A thorough examination of these primary source 
documents and historical works reveal important dynamics that made the UKUSA 
intelligence relationship successful and offers a significant model for U.S.–NATO 
intelligence sharing. 
                                                
2 The term “out of area” refers to those areas outside of NATO’s traditional sphere of influence as 
defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
3 In the fall of 2011, President Obama announced a “pivot” or “rebalancing” of American foreign 
policy and defense interests toward the Asian-Pacific region.  
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C. PROBLEMS 
The principal problems with this subject surround the premise that NATO 
intelligence is unable to meet NATO operational demands, which makes the Alliance 
dependent on U.S. intelligence for success. Furthermore, the U.S.-NATO intelligence 
sharing relationship is not well developed outside of operational necessity and exhibits 
severe fluctuations. Those propositions further support the notion that in order to improve 
NATO intelligence support the U.S must broaden its sharing relationship. Because this 
thesis proposes to deal with a specific instance of intelligence sharing, we must examine 
the limited information available on NATO intelligence sharing since the Cold War to 
identify key dynamics or intelligence sharing characteristics within the Alliance. Finally, 
the ability to identify or measure the effectiveness of intelligence sharing is necessarily 
predicated upon the ability to in some way cite an intelligence sharing agreement or its 
inputs and outputs. In this case, the procedures for U.S.-NATO sharing are necessarily 
obfuscated or classified. 
Evaluating intelligence agreements is difficult because the pacts are typically 
enacted to protect information not available to the public. As the information itself is 
secret, so too is the agreement that governs how the information is shared. The recently 
declassified documents surrounding the UKUSA Signals Intelligence agreement are 
unique in that they offer insight into the circumstances in which the arrangement was 
formed and the political and bureaucratic environment in which the formation of the 
agreement played out. Initial research indicates that the UKUSA agreement established a 
formalized convention of intelligence sharing that enabled a predictable series of 
interactions between the U.S. and U.K. that over time facilitated a closer, more trusted 
sharing relationship.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The problems that bear out from this subject necessarily lead to two primary areas 
of scholarship for further exploration: the history of NATO intelligence sharing since 
1990, and the UKUSA Signals Intelligence agreement. Generally, the scholarship in each 
area is thin and, with one notable exception, the literature in each topic area is derived 
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from specific events where authors have tried to contextualize noteworthy occurrences 
into an overarching framework. 
This contextualization is particularly true with regard to intelligence sharing 
theory. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the future focus of domestic and 
foreign intelligence communities became part of the debate as the communities’ primary 
target, the U.S.S.R, faded.4  A long-time scholar on intelligence and intelligence 
cooperation, Jeffrey T. Richelson, provided the first response in his article, “The Calculus 
of Intelligence Cooperation,” followed in 1996 by H. Bradford Westerfield’s, “America 
and the World of Intelligence Liaison.”5 In addition to emphasizing the need for 
intelligence cooperation or ‘liaison,’ each article identifies the types of intelligence 
sharing that occurs as well as the costs and benefits for each. Unique to this dialogue is 
Richelson’s proposal that intelligence sharing agreements can drive the individual value 
of both costs and benefits, thus potentially weighting the equation toward establishing a 
sharing relationship.6  
After, and likely in response to, the changing environment produced by 
September 11, 2001, as well as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the scholarship on 
intelligence sharing theory continued using the terminology of economics and business to 
describe the factors and constraints on cooperation. A 2006 article by Jennifer Sims 
“Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details,” states her intention is to, “help 
governments manage costs, risks, and gains of intelligence operations among states.”7 
Further, she proposes that liaison is in fact, “a form of subcontracted intelligence 
collection based on barter.”8 The transactional argument for intelligence sharing 
culminated in James I. Walsh’s book The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing. 
                                                
4 Arthur S. Hulnick, “Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Game Plan?” 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 5, no. 4 (1992): 455.  
5 J.T. Richelson, “The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counter Intelligence 4, no. 3 (1990): 307–323. H. Bradford Westerfield, “America and the World of 
Intelligence Liaison,” Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 3 (1996): 523–560. 
6 Richelson, “Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,” 318–319. 
7 Jennifer E. Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details,” International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 2 (2006): 196.  
8 Ibid. 
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Here, Walsh looks to relational contracting as the key to understanding sharing 
relationships.9 He states, “Intelligence is a valuable commodity, and states bargain with 
one another to obtain the best possible return before agreeing to share it.”10 In his 
scheme, states are driven by the fear of defection of various sorts to enact structures that 
reduce uncertainty.  
Apart from explanations for why states share, or the frameworks they establish in 
intelligence agreements, there is even less literature that covers why states or 
organizations do not share potentially valuable intelligence. As James Wirtz has pointed 
out, the sharing of intelligence or intelligence relationships may prove domestically 
untenable.11 Furthermore, Bjorn Fagerstein argues that state-to-state relations are not the 
only factors that determine a relationship’s effectiveness, but bureaucratic negative 
incentives may actually inhibit sharing.12 In 2012, Adam Svendsen goes further and 
identifies the complexity and interconnectedness between international relations and 
intelligence sharing by identifying eight levels where intelligence sharing occurs. 
Transactional costs play less a role in Svendsen’s theory; he instead relies on schools of 
international relations theory to identify sharing causation, but notes that at various levels 
one must apply multiple theories to offering comprehensive understanding of intelligence 
sharing relationships. Critically, Svendsen identifies the limits of this approach and the 
lack of general theories to understand this discipline.13   
The dialogue over intelligence sharing, while not as robust as other disciplines, 
tends to focus on the reasons states share while limiting the influence of other, external 
factors. Through the examination of the UKUSA model we discover that the relationship 
most closely aligns with Svendsen’s ideas on a practical model for intelligence sharing 
                                                
9 James I. Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010), 4. 
10 Ibid. 
11 James J. Wirtz, “Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension.” 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 6, no. 1 (1993): 87.  
12 Fägersten, Björn. “Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation—The Case of 
Europol.” Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 4 (2010): 500.  
13 Adam D.M. Svendsen, Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method Out of 
Mayhem (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 63–71, 117–118. 
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that functions at multiple levels. This does not, however, abandon Walsh’s prevalent 
theory on the regimes established to establish and solidify reliability between partners.  
Moving from theory to practice, insightful examples of NATO-U.S. cooperation 
are rare because it is hard to see inside an active intelligence sharing relationship. Few 
current records point to what specific intelligence the U.S. has shared with NATO since 
1990, but we do have some understanding of the operational successes and failures of the 
relationship in the post-Cold War Era. In order to place post-1990 examples in context 
this thesis briefly examines the history of NATO intelligence. Intelligence estimates 
became tools for determining the number and type of forces required to hold back the 
Cold War Soviet threat. As NATO relied on collective defense mechanisms to ensure the 
security of its members, each ally had to allocate a portion of their defense resources 
toward the needs of the whole. Alliance members, however, leveraged intelligence 
assessments to lessen their national burdens and shift the requirements onto other. Thus, 
traditional attempts at burden-sharing, to distribute costs, became efforts toward burden-
shifting, to transfer costs onto others.14 The inclination toward burden-shifting created an 
incentive for member nations to control intelligence dialogue, which hindered the 
development of a functioning NATO operational intelligence organization or mechanism. 
Major General Edward Atkeson (USA) provides a Cold War example of the dysfunction 
of NATO intelligence in his 1984 article, “NATO Intelligence: A Contradiction in 
Terms,” where he discusses the lack of a central NATO military intelligence authority to 
combat the uncertainty of a NATO-Soviet ground war on the plains of central Europe.15 
As the Soviet Union disintegrated in the early 1990s NATO faced an identity 
crisis that moved the Alliance from collective defense, to a collective security 
organization focused on a myriad of potential tasks.16 The break-up of Yugoslavia caused 
major power instabilities in the Balkans, and in 1994, NATO undertook peacekeeping in 
                                                
14 Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden Shifting in NATO (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2003). 
15 Edward B. Atkeson, NATO Intelligence: A Contradiction in Terms (Langley, VA: Central 
Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1984), accessed on March 24, 2012, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol53no1/from-the-archives-1984-design-for-dysfunction.html. 
16 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1999). 
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Bosnia to prevent further conflict. Again in 1999, set against the backdrop of renewed 
hostilities, NATO conducted an air campaign and deployed peacekeepers to Kosovo. 
Coordinated Air, Land, and Sea operations emphasized many of the incongruences in 
U.S. vs. European NATO capabilities.  
Several publications have highlighted the gaps in U.S. vs. Allied intelligence 
capabilities. Writing for the Department of Defense, Larry Wentz in Lessons from 
Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, states: “National intelligence support plans were closely 
held and therefore it was not clear to IFOR and others what nations would bring what 
capabilities in terms of intelligence systems to support IFOR requirements.” Other 
experience suggests the U.S. dominated intelligence production, but also that intelligence 
sharing in Bosnia was hampered by U.S. stove-piping.17 Additionally, this developed 
intelligence had to be shared in order to be effective.18 NATO operations in Kosovo in 
1999 revealed startling discrepancies in intelligence capabilities. Writing on NATO 
operations, David Yost in his article “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European 
Union,” provides the potential reasons behind the mismatch including defense 
procurement priorities, European conscription rules, and a U.S. emphasis on fighting 
abroad.19 Yost writes, “Thanks in large part to its satellites, superior UAVs and 
reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, the United States met approximately 95% of 
NATO intelligence requirements.”20 
This body of text is representative of a field of literature that covers the lack of 
European military ability to operate beyond their borders and the subsequent domination 
of U.S. intelligence when conducting coalition operations. It highlights the difference in 
outlook after the fall of the Soviet Union and the European desire to reap a post-Cold 
War peace dividend. While not specific about the amount or type of intelligence shared, 
                                                
17 Barrett K. Peavie, “Intelligence Sharing in Bosnia,” Monograph, School of Advanced Military 
Studies, U.S. Army Command and Staff College (Academic Year 2000–2001), accessed on 26 March, 
2012 www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA387143. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Yost, David S. “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union.” Survival 42, no. 4 (2000):  
99–103.  
20 Ibid., 104. “…met approximately 95% of NATO intelligence requirements,” quoted from James P. 
Thomas, “Transatlantic Coalitions in the 1990s.” The Adelphi Papers 40, no. 333 (2008): 52. 
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these texts give a sense of the technological gap between allies and indicate that, during 
times of crisis, the U.S. does share intelligence. Finally, the analysis contained here 
identifies when sharing occurs on a large scale and when it does not.  
Absent from this discussion are the conflicts in Afghanistan, and Libya. 
Scholarship on the intelligence sharing aspect of NATO’s limited involvement and 
sharing operations in Afghanistan and Libya is still likely forthcoming. Press reports and 
congressional/parliamentary records provide some insight to these conflicts. The 2006 
creation of the U.S.-led NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) also demonstrates 
American capacity to share intelligence, particularly in light of new NATO members and 
operations in Afghanistan.  
Furthermore, sharing intelligence with NATO does not always improve the 
accuracy or timeliness of NATO intelligence assessments. Political concerns can often 
override the intelligence assessment process so that information gained to support a 
particular hypothesis in a given situation could advance a posture or policy stance that 
violates the national policy of an Alliance member.21 This situation is less likely for 
purely military problems or information, but remains a significant hurdle for indications 
and warnings of an impending crisis. The lack of comprehensive intelligence support at 
the operational level NATO commands can lead to competing assessments or an 
incomplete picture. Currently, the IFC is a framework organization operated under the 
auspices of the United States. It has no formal placement in the integrated military 
structure and therefore no codified duties toward the component commands or the Joint 
Force Headquarters.  
The state of the NATO-U.S. sharing relationship is contrasted against the U.S.-
U.K. relationship codified, first by the signals intelligence agreement in 1943 and later by 
the BRUSA agreement in 1946. This agreement was the foundation for the sharing of 
signals intelligence during the Cold War and the “special relationship” between the 
                                                
21 David S. Yost, NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture After the Chicago Summit: A Report on  a 
Workshop in Rome, 25–27 June 2012 (Rome, IT: NATO Defence College, October 2012),13; Ronald 
Asmus, et al., NATO, New Allies and Reassurance (London, UK: Centre for European Reform, May 12, 
2010) 2, accessed on January 21, 2013, http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/policy-brief/2010/nato-
new-allies-and-reassurance. 
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United States and United Kingdom that is so often cited by diplomats as evidence of 
Anglo-American foreign policy convergence. The U.S.–U.K. “special relationship” was 
never a foregone conclusion and was, in fact, forged despite the American military’s 
perception of Britain as a rival and potential enemy. The formation of an intelligence 
cooperative with a recent rival lends itself to the notion that, despite the accession of 
former communist states to NATO, establishing institutions of trust between former 
rivals is possible.  
Critical to this work is the narrative told by NSA historians and the release of 
NSA and GCHQ documents from 1943–1955. Each organization released over 1200 
document pages. Unique to this release is the disclosure of many classified notes between 
high-ranking military commanders, as well as the initial proposal to share from the U.K. 
Notably these memoranda shed light on the bureaucratic dynamic of how and under what 
circumstances states share intelligence.  
Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball crafted the seminal work on the modern 
function of the agreement: The Ties that Bind.22 This work examines the intelligence 
structures and functions of both the first and second parties to the agreement, which 
include Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, while demonstrating the origins and intent 
of the UKUSA agreement. Nearly equally compelling is the story of the creation of the 
United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) by Richard 
Aldrich.23 These works bring together biography and history to contextualize the creation 
of the UKUSA agreement that began during World War II and continued into the mid-
1950s. What they unfortunately lack, are the documents themselves. In June of 2010, 
both the NSA and GCHQ released the original agreements and background documents 
allowing this thesis to examine the biography and history in a new light.24 This release 
highlighted the source material for an early, but often neglected work on the formation of 
cryptologic support agencies during World War II. Authored by Robert Benson, this 
small, but vital work, relies on interviews and the source documents not released until 
                                                
22 Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball. The Ties That Bind. (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985). 
23 Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency. 
London, Harperpress, 2010. 
24 “UKUSA Agreement Release 1940–1956,” National Security Agency, accessed on March 22, 2013, 
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/ukusa.shtml. 
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2010 to complete the internal picture on cryptologic activity during this period.25 These 
documents illuminate both the circumstances of the series of agreements and reveal the 
underpinnings for the success of the relationship.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis examines current U.S.-NATO intelligence sharing and the potential for 
future problems while dissecting the UKUSA agreement to identify leverage points for 
reinforcing an enduring U.S.-NATO intelligence sharing relationship in military affairs. 
The sources used here focus on attacking the problems identified above. Scholarly 
sources are critical in identifying and sorting the mechanism that facilitate the sharing of 
intelligence between states. Assessing the state of the U.S. NATO intelligence sharing 
since the Cold War, however, requires sources of various types. Scholars have, at least in 
part, identified the sharing scenarios that occurred in Bosnia and Kosovo. Less scholarly 
work has been written on Afghanistan, and Libya; as such, this paper relies on 
congressional/parliamentary records as well as press reports and other official documents. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of two basic components with an introduction and conclusion 
serving as bookends. Chapter I, the introduction, introduces the basic research question 
and explores the methods used to answer it including sections that define intelligence and 
identify the overall scope of the paper. Chapter II examines the history of NATO 
intelligence as it relates to the development of an operational support capability as well as 
NATO-U.S. intelligence-sharing since the Cold War with a focus on coalition military 
operations. Chapter III focuses on the enduring signals intelligence relationship formed 
between the United States and United Kingdom during World War II, the 1943 U.S.–U.K 
Agreement. As such, it examines the UKUSA agreement’s underpinnings based on 
primary sources documents and secondary historical accounts. Last, Chapter IV explores 
conclusions and recommendations for strengthening the intelligence-sharing bond 
between the U.S. and NATO with policy prescriptions that include the U.S. strategic shift 
east and the potential for NATO (Allied) vs. NATO (U.S.)-led operations in the future.  
  
                                                
25 Robert Benson, A History of U.S. Communications Intelligence During World War II: Policy and 
Administration (Washington, DC: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 1997).  
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II. NATO INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. INTELLIGENCE: 
SEPARATE BUT NOT EQUAL 
A. NATO: THE INFLUENCE OF INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1949 as a check 
on Soviet power, but transitioned to something much more after the Soviet Union’s 
breakup in 1990. The treaty tied North America and Europe together in a collective 
defense scheme codified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty whereby “The Parties 
agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall 
be considered an attack against them all.” This level of cooperation required intelligence 
estimates of the Soviet Union to help NATO defend its security interests in crises, which 
were in turn politicized and hindered the development of intelligence support 
mechanisms at the operational level. The lack of operational intelligence mechanisms 
during the Cold War created a significant gap in NATO intelligence capabilities, which 
had negative effects on the Alliance’s ability to support NATO operations in the post-
Cold War era. During each major NATO operation the U.S. had to increase intelligence 
support disproportionately to bolster NATO capabilities. This situation created an 
unstable foundation for U.S. intelligence sharing with NATO whereby the U.S. 
temporarily bolsters NATO capabilities to ensure mission success, which hinders the 
development of autonomous NATO intelligence support.   
This chapter seeks to identify the political problems that affected the Alliance 
intelligence structure in its early years, and the ramifications for NATO operations in the 
1990s and early twenty-first century. First, we explore the influence of intelligence 
assessments on the formation of NATO strategy. The politicization of intelligence 
estimates disinclined the members to form operational intelligence support mechanisms. 
The key outcome we focus on here is the lack of a military operational intelligence 
structure, which led to poor intelligence support to NATO expeditionary operations. 
Second, we identify the shift in NATO’s strategic orientation in the early 1990s that 
transitioned toward “out of area operations.” This section examines post-Cold War major 
NATO operations beginning with a brief overview and moves to post-operation after-
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action reports that highlight NATO’s capability gaps and U.S. efforts to bridge the gap 
‘in situ.’ The third section concerns the effects of the NATO’s capabilities gap identified 
in the 1990s as the U.S. marched to war in Afghanistan in 2001 without the Alliance.26 
The fourth section identifies the intelligence capability gaps from the Libya campaign in 
2011. Despite new agencies and 10 years of close intelligence cooperation involving the 
United States and the other NATO Allies, significant Alliance intelligence support 
problems were identified during the Libya operation. Last, the conclusion to this chapter 
identifies the enduring NATO intelligence support problem and posits that because of the 
recently announced strategic rebalance toward the Pacific, the full range of U.S. assets 
may not be available for a major NATO operation. Consequently, the U.S. intelligence 
community should broaden and deepen its relationship with NATO to offset this potential 
contingency.  
B. EARLY DAYS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN TO THE END OF 
THE COLD WAR 
Discussions on a formalized transatlantic agreement began in 1947 and played out 
against the galvanizing backdrop of 1948-1949 as the Soviets backed a coup in 
Czechoslovakia and later moved to block the land routes to West Berlin. Negotiations 
over a potential pact emphasized the principles of self-help and mutual aid, which 
became the focal points for future discussions on Allied defense production and 
allocation. 
The collective defense obligations created under Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty necessitated the creation of subcommittees and organizations allowed for under 
Article 9. The formation of the Military and Defence Committees in 1949 provided a 
means to define collective defense strategy and produced the intelligence assessments on 
                                                
26 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Alliance did vote for the declaration of Article 
5 and the U.S. did request some limited assistance from NATO. That assistance was mostly logistical in 
nature, but NATO did provide Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) missions during 
Operation Eagle Assist to free up U.S. AWACS aircraft for operations in Afghanistan. See “Statement to 
the Press by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, on the North Atlantic Council Decision On 
Implementation Of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the 
United States,” NATO HQ, Brussels, October 4, 2001, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001 
/s011004b.htm.  
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which NATO’s first strategic defense document, DC 6/1, were based. Intelligence 
exchange among NATO members at this time centered on the production of these types 
of estimates in order to formulate strategy, estimate the number and types of NATO 
forces required to defend Europe, as well as provided a guide for Allied equipment and 
production quotas.27 
In 1950, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the appointment of U.S. 
General Dwight Eisenhower as Supreme Commander Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR) and endowed him with a small staff. The creation of a formalized military 
head, the SACEUR, reflected the acknowledged need for a reassessment of Allied 
strategy and accordingly, Soviet capabilities. His review of Soviet capabilities and 
intentions in light of the Korean War encouraged him to pursue a conventional and 
nuclear buildup on the continent. The outgrowth of his assessments became the NAC’s 
agreement on an ambitious force structure of 75 divisions, 6,500 aircraft, and more than 
700 vessels assigned to the defense of Europe.28 These force figures were driving 
intelligence exchange in order to produce strategic intelligence estimates of Soviet 
capabilities. The Allies were not focused on establishing operational intelligence 
mechanisms.  
During the Cold War, the Alliance was disinclined to adopt another intelligence 
mechanism because even the debates over intelligence estimates had become highly 
politicized. NATO members manipulated force projection numbers and methods so the 
Soviet threat appeared more or less menacing, as political and fiscal needs dictated the 
willingness and ability of members to invest in NATO capabilities. In the early 1950s the 
best intelligence estimates indicated that Allied forces needed to muster 160 divisions for 
an attack; a number the Allies could not hope to match without throwing their economies 
into disarray.29 This inability for the Allied forces to reach parity with the Soviets and the 
end of active fighting in the Korean War induced President Eisenhower to seek spending 
                                                
27 Thies, Friendly Rivals, 81, 96 
28 Ibid.; NATO Military Strategy Document MC 48 (1954); Robert S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War 
NATO Supreme Commander (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000), 84. 
29 Thies, Friendly Rivals, 61 
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cuts in defense through an increased reliance on nuclear weapons, which would extend to 
Europe as well. NATO codified the increased European reliance on American nuclear 
weapons through the adoption of the “massive retaliation” strategy in 1957. 30 
President Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara sought to 
change this calculus through the intelligence estimate process. In 1961, President 
Kennedy sought to create legitimate conventional force capability options on the 
European continent in order to decrease the reliance on nuclear weapons in the event of a 
Soviet conventional force attack as part of his “Flexible Response” doctrine. Towards 
that end U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara changed the U.S. intelligence 
contribution to NATO intelligence by emphasizing the qualitative differences in Soviet 
vs. Allied divisions. 31 The changes in these calculations would allow the Allies to 
achieve parity with Soviet military through modest additions to Allied conventional 
forces in Europe.32    
In 1967-1968 NATO adopted the Flexible Response strategy of preparedness for 
measured escalation, but the Alliance never fully acquired the proposed additions to the 
conventional force structure. The debate over conventional capabilities emerged again in 
the early 1970s, this time at the behest of U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. 
Well before the debates over the “dual-track” strategy, the Schlesinger Initiative looked 
to raise NATO conventional capabilities. Once again, the debate between U.S. and 
European NATO members centered on assessments of Soviet capabilities. According to 
Schlesinger’s estimate, many of the 175 Soviet divisions were not at a level of readiness 
that would support employment in combat, and based on the locations of a portion of the 
Soviet garrisons it was not feasible for them to enter a conflict in a timely manner. 
Therefore, the SECDEF argued that NATO and Soviet forces were already at a rough 
parity and that the addition of a few more military divisions to the Alliance would swing 
                                                
30 NATO Military Strategy Document DC 6/1 (1949); Gregory Pedlow, The Evolution of NATO 
Strategy 1949–1969, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, XIII, accessed on March 22, 2013, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf. 
31 Jorg Baldauf, “How Big is the Threat to Europe: Transatlantic Debates Over the Balance of Forces,” 
RAND (October 1987), 6–8. 
32 Ibid. 
 17 
conventional superiority toward NATO. European assessments, on the other hand, 
included every Soviet division, regardless of its readiness level or geographic proximity 
as a potential combatant, which increased the size of the Soviet threat.33 According to a 
RAND report, “From the European perspective, NATO’s conventional inferiority 
legitimized the continued emphasis on NATO’s nuclear elements.”34  
1. WHY NATO INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES MATTER  
Some critics have argued that the lack of a credible NATO military intelligence 
capability is the result of a lack of European investment. While this might be true, it is 
indicative of a deeper cause that reaches back to these debates over intelligence 
assessments. As a result, NATO members were disinclined to allow the formation of 
operational intelligence organizations during the Cold War. Intelligence dialogue at the 
operational level would inevitably affect the intelligence estimate process and could 
result in a scenario where an individual NATO member would shoulder what it viewed as 
an undue burden on its national assets.  
2. NATO INTELLIGENCE: DESIGN FOR DISFUNCTION 
Early in the Alliance’s history it was not obvious that a coordinated operational 
intelligence organization was necessary, but by the 1980s there was clearly a need for 
some mechanism to bridge the gap between the strategic and operational levels of war. 
During the Cold War, NATO plans called for operational commanders to focus on 
breaking out from their garrison positions to confront Soviet armor division rushing 
through the Fulda Gap.35 The tactics of the tank engagement outweighed any concerns 
over intelligence sharing until the front was stabilized. Once the front was stabilized, it 
was assumed Corps commanders would exchange information as needed, just as they did 
during World War II. As military tactics and weaponry became more sophisticated, this 
                                                
33 Ibid., 12–14 
34 Ibid., 41 
35 David S. Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap,” 99. 
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approach became untenable. Allied forces required greater integration and unity of effort, 
which required increased information pushed down to the operational level.36  
The first indication we have that NATO operational intelligence was 
malfunctioning was during the 1980s when Maj. General Edward Atkeson recognized 
that operational commanders needed a robust, redundant NATO intelligence mechanism. 
Instead, according to Atkeson, NATO members organized their combined military 
structure to avoid dealing with intelligence altogether on a collective basis:  
Not only is the operational command system virtually blind, but the 
subordinate national entities have intelligence capabilities so varied as to 
promote conflicting views of the battlefield among the various national 
and international headquarters. Instead of enhancing the effectiveness of 
the defense, the NATO intelligence system—which exists more by 
accident than design—seems to offer more opportunities for dysfunction 
than for positive support of the enterprise. Without a common intelligence 
system, over which it has some influence and directive authority, the 
Alliance is virtually doomed to drift, while a few concerned member 
nations—most particularly the U.S.—seek inefficient quick fixes for 
treating the symptoms of a disease that, if put to the test of combat, has 
high probability of proving fatal.37  
The crux of his argument is that NATO never incorporated an operational 
intelligence structure that coordinated information across Corps commanders during 
peace and that, in the event of a war, the Allies’ success was clearly at risk as a result of 
this failure. Critically, he also states that, according to SACEUR General Bernard Rogers, 
90 per cent of the intelligence SACEUR receives comes from the U.S.38 This tendency 
for the U.S. to continue providing the overwhelming majority of intelligence support 
becomes more evident in NATO’s post-Cold War conflicts.  
C. NATO’S POST-COLD WAR STRATEGY AND EVOLUTION 
In late 1989, the threat presented by the U.S.S.R. began to fade and the impetus 
for large-scale NATO defense planning and assessments lost momentum due to the lack 
                                                




of a serious enemy and existential threat. In 1991, the Alliance began a slow march from 
policies centered on providing for a common defense toward the pursuit of complex 
collective security responsibilities.39 The 1991 NATO Strategic Concept identified the 
uncertainty of the new security environment and the potential for “serious economic, 
social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries.”40 Well into the 1990s, tasks 
for the Alliance continued to build on the 1967 Harmel Report’s recommendation for the 
development of political dialogue, especially with former adversaries, and a 
complementary conventional military capability that ensured NATO’s security.41 The 
promotion of stability in former Eastern Bloc or non-aligned countries required that 
NATO undertake a role in crisis management and conflict resolution. The language of the 
1991 Strategic Concept, however, underscored the notion that Alliance interests remained 
focused on collective defense within the territory defined in Article 6 of the NATO 
Treaty.42 By 1992, however, this same document facilitated a transition toward out of 
area tasks and intervention in out of area conflicts.43  
The shift in NATO’s post-Cold War outlook was also accompanied by a 
transformation from static forces toward the U.S.-influenced Combined Joint Task Force 
concept whereby multinational, multiservice commands were created for specific 
operations. The U.S. shifted toward this model after the 1984 Goldwater-Nichols Act, 
and from an intelligence support perspective, the U.S. Joint Task Force relied on national 
intelligence architectures to support expeditionary operations. During NATO’s slow 
transition toward this concept, however, no mechanisms were established to incorporate 
that same design for operational intelligence support. Furthermore, the concept was 
originally launched in 1993, but never fully implemented by the integrated military 
                                                
39 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed.  
40 NATO, 1991 Strategic Concept, part I, para. 5 and 9. 
41 The 1967 Harmel Report emphasized the political and military nature of the Alliance. Following 
these two principles it concluded that military strength must be coupled with political engagement. See 
NATO, “The Harmel Rerport,” November 12, 2010, accessed on June 1, 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natolive/topics_67927.htm.  
42 Yost, NATO Transformed, 192. 
43 Stanley R. Sloan, Permanent Alliance?: NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to 
Obama, Kindle edition (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), Chp. 11. 
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structure until 1999, after the lessons of Bosnia and Kosovo.44 Despite NATO’s 
transition to expeditionary operations in the Balkans, this unaltered NATO force structure 
left serious gaps in operational intelligence support, which were only filled by the U.S. to 
ensure success.  
1. OVERVIEW OF EVENTS AND OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA 1992–
1995 
NATO’s willingness and ability to conduct major out of area operations was first 
tested during the crisis in Bosnia from 1992–1995.45 The Alliance began conducting 
Operation Maritime Monitor in July 1992 to enforce an arms embargo on the warring 
factions in the former Yugoslavia vying for independence amid the breakup of 
Yugoslavia. This operation was quickly followed with the more aggressive maritime 
blockade of the former Yugoslavia during Operation Maritime Guard later that same 
year. In 1993, NATO began Operation Deny Flight along with a combined naval 
operation with the Western European Union (WEU), Operation Sharp Guard, to continue 
the enforcement of United Nation Security Council resolutions 713 and 757. American 
participation during these phases of the Bosnian conflict consisted primarily of support to 
NATO coordinating authorities utilizing existing U.S. command, control, and intelligence 
support functions.46  
In 1994, NATO continued efforts to enforce UNSC sanctions and the no-fly zone 
over Yugoslavia. Two events pushed the Alliance toward intervention: a Serbian mortar 
attack on Sarajevo killed 28 civilians and the Serbs attempted to contravene the no-fly 
zone. NATO responded through limited bombing and by shooting down four Serbian 
tactical aircraft. These actions began an increase in NATO operations over Bosnia as 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) commanders called for Allied tactical air 
                                                
44 Mario da Silva, “Implementing the Combined Joint Task Force Concept,” NATO Review 26 no. 4 
(Winter 1998), accessed on June 1, 2013, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9804-05.htm; Javier 
Solana, “The Washington Summit: NATO Steps Boldly Into The 21st Century,” NATO Review 47 no. 1 
(Spring 1999), accessed on June 1, 2013, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9901-01.htm.  
45 NATO conducted smaller out of area operations as early as 1990 to monitor Turkey’s border with 
Iraq during the non-NATO Operation DESERT STORM. A comprehensive list of NATO operations can be 
found at http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/21/NATOOperations, 1949-Present.pdf.   
46 Yost, NATO Transformed, 194. 
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support against Serbian targets with increasing frequency. Operation Deliberate Force 
was the culmination of this bombing campaign in August-September 1995 as Allied 
forces conducted two weeks of intense strikes against Bosnian Serb critical nodes in 
response to the second attack on civilians at a Sarajevo market. The bombing campaign 
pressured all sides toward negotiation, and an agreement was reached on November 21, 
1995 at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. The Dayton Accords called 
for the deployment of a NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR). A 
smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR one year later. NATO’s tasks were to 
command and administer the forces that would oversee the cessation of hostilities and the 
withdrawal or redeployment of the belligerents, as well as the process for creating lines 
of demarcation and separation between ethnically sensitive areas.  
2. NATO INTELLIGENCE DIFFICULTIES IN BOSNIA AND U.S. 
SHARING  
The Deliberate Force bombing campaign and the deployment of troops in support 
of IFOR found NATO intelligence capabilities wanting, which compelled the United 
States to fill the operational intelligence gaps. In this context, intelligence gaps derived 
from the lack of personnel, systems, and equipment to support operational requirements.  
Previous military actions in Bosnia throughout 1992 and 1993 were single 
reactionary events. Violations of the blockade or of the no-fly zone had to occur in order 
to provoke a NATO military reaction, which was limited in scope to a single event. The 
assets and coordination required to perform these operations never pushed NATO, the 
organization, beyond its command and control limits. Once a deliberate bombing 
campaign had been decided upon, coalition personnel, particularly U.S. military leaders 
serving in a NATO role, recognized the Alliance’s inability to conduct major operations 
similar to Desert Storm. Accordingly, U.S. military leaders performed a complete 
“Americanization” of the NATO Combined Air Operations Center in order to ensure the 
center’s readiness.47 This included efforts to reform the ‘backward’ and ‘unpracticed’ 
                                                
47 Robert C. Owen ed., Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning, (Maxwell Air 
Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2000), 482. This included “several hundred TDY augmentees” 
and a “flood of state-of-the-art communications, intelligence, and automated planning systems.” 
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NATO staffs unfamiliar with intelligence support to strike operations, specifically Battle 
Damage Assessment.48 Similarly, the U.S. airborne intelligence missions constituted 92% 
of the total of 169 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance flights. In Electronic 
Warfare (EW) the U.S. also provided 89% of the Suppression of Enemy Air Defense 
(SEAD) missions.49 The two-week bombing campaign stretched even the American 
ability to bolster NATO intelligence, but the campaign brought an end to active fighting 
and facilitated the negotiation of the Dayton Accords.   
The gaps in NATO intelligence support mechanisms became more pronounced as 
the Alliance moved toward ground operations in Bosnia. This situation induced NATO, 
including the U.S., to rely on American intelligence capabilities to meet operational 
demands. For command, control, and intelligence purposes, the United States provided 
46 out of 48 satellite channels, according to German General Klaus Naumann, head of the 
NATO Military Committee.50 He pointed out that it would be impossible for the other 
Allies to conduct sustained NATO operations without U.S. support because the U.S. 
provides all satellite intelligence, jamming, and technological contributions and the 
Americans flew two-thirds of all sorties.51 Even with U.S. support, IFOR experienced 
significant obstacles because of communication and encryption compatibility problems as 
well as differing classification standards.52  
In the run up to Operation Deliberate Force or prior to the deployment of IFOR 
there appears to have been little planning for operational intelligence support. This was 
particularly evident in U.S. after action reports. Writing for the U.S. Department of 
Defense, Larry Wentz explains “there was no single doctrine for multinational 
intelligence operations or intelligence architecture. The nations developed their own 
                                                
48 Mark C. McLaughlin, “Combat Assessment: A Commander’s Responsibility,” in Deliberate Force: 
A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning, ed. Robert C. Owen, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air 
University Press, 2000), 182, 186. 
49 Richard L. Sargent, “Deliberate Force Combat Air Assessments,” in Deliberate Force: A Case 
Study in Effective Air Campaigning, ed. Robert C. Owen (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air 
University Press, 2000), 348. 
50 Yost, NATO Transformed, 212. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ian Q.R. Thomas, Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination (Lanham, UK: 
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approach to establish the foundation on which IFOR built its coalition intelligence 
operation.”53 Accordingly, the Americans, the British, and the French deployed national 
intelligence teams to conduct intelligence operations under the Commander of the Allied 
Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), but national intelligence support plans were closely held, 
so it was not clear exactly how the national teams supported IFOR as a whole.54 For the 
United States, this created a dual support structure with U.S. support to U.S. units and 
U.S. support to NATO as a whole.55 The dual structure created further concerns over 
local responsibility to disseminate and release intelligence because of the multitude of 
conflicting rules and procedures.56 Despite doctrinal changes early in the operation, the 
new guidelines were not followed by the end of 1996.57 The inability to enact a coherent 
policy on intelligence dissemination revealed the lack of planning and coordination 
among NATO members.  
Eventually, the U.S. reformed its intelligence support practices to encompass a 
multinational environment. By the end of the IFOR mandate U.S. intelligence sharing 
efforts increased so that “intelligence flowed smoothly across channels, with U.S. support 
nearly transparent to NATO.”58 While the operation revealed the weakness of NATO 
operational intelligence support, it also showed the willingness of the United States to 
increase its intelligence efforts to ensure the success of the mission. On first glance, 
European support capabilities to Deliberate Force and IFOR appear wanting, but this was 
not a European effort. It was a NATO effort. The NATO post-Cold War defense planning 
process failed in the creation of intelligence capabilities that support the Alliance as a 
whole.  
Defense planning in the United States was and has always been based on a 
deployable force projection posture with appropriate intelligence support, but the United 
States neglected to insist on the extension of this concept to its NATO Allies even during 
                                                
53 Larry Wentz, “Intelligence Operations,” in Larry Wentz, ed., Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR 
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54 Ibid., 60, 75, 81. 
55 Ibid.,, 75. 
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the debates over out of area operations. The unwillingness of the NATO Allies, including 
the United States, to immediately confront these gaps in the NATO command structure 
probably represented a continuation of the burden-sharing/burden-shifting debates that 
have characterized Alliance relations since 1949. If the U.S. recognized this problem 
within its own forces, but never confronted the lack of intelligence support for Allied 
operations, the blame for deficient NATO intelligence capability investment in the 1990s 
falls on the U.S. for not raising this issue as much as it does on European and Canadian 
governments for not providing resources against the problem once operations in Bosnia 
made it clear. Furthermore, this lack of intelligence capability investment at the NATO 
command level created a cycle of dependence on U.S. intelligence-sharing during crises, 
which enabled the Alliance to put these problems aside during times of peace or lack of 
conflict. This intelligence capability gap and propensity for U.S. ‘crisis-sharing’ become 
clear once more when we examine the 1999 events in Kosovo.  
3. OVERVEIW OF EVENTS AND OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO 1999 
Following the relatively successful NATO operation in Bosnia, the situation in the 
Balkans once again began to deteriorate, which prompted the Allies to intervene. This 
time the relationship within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between the government 
in Belgrade and the formerly autonomous region of Kosovo broke down over potential 
independence for the province. As the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, led by Slobodan 
Milosevic, forced the Kosovars toward greater integration with the rest of Serbia and 
strengthened Belgrade’s authority over the province, conflict broke out between ethnic 
Albanian Kosovar guerrilla elements such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and 
Serbian regular and paramilitary forces. Both sides conducted brutal campaigns in the 
region, but the Serbs created a serious humanitarian situation in 1998 as they drove ethnic 
Albanians from Kosovo en masse, which, to some observers, appeared as a move toward 
genocide.  
In September 1998, the United Nations Security Council issued resolution 1199, 
which called for an end to the violence and the return of all refugees to their homes. Serb 
units, however, continued to act against the KLA in contravention of the UNSCR. By 
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mid-October 1998 NATO responded by authorizing the activation of several units for 
potential air strikes and establishing an air surveillance mission, Operation Eagle Eye, to 
complement the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) de-
escalation and monitoring efforts. Serbian transgressions against the ethnic Albanian 
Kosovars continued and eventually resulted in the withdrawal of the OSCE Kosovo 
Verification Mission (KVM). The failure by President Milosevic to withdraw his forces 
from Kosovo prompted NATO to launch a seventy-seven day air campaign, Operation 
Allied Force, on March 24, 1999.59 Eventually, Serbian forces were withdrawn from 
Kosovo and NATO deployed a peacekeeping force, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which 
has maintained a continual presence in the region to this day. The combat phase of this 
operation dwarfed that of Bosnia, and as such, the successes and difficulties experienced 
by the Alliance here underscore the lack of a NATO operational military intelligence 
organization and the role the United States played in securing victory.  
4. NATO INTELLIGENCE DIFFICULTIES IN KOSOVO AND U.S. 
SHARING  
The operation, and more specifically, the political dialogue that accompanied the 
operation, were successful, but to read the U.S. after action reports it would appear that 
many military and government officials were alarmed at the discrepancy between U.S. 
and European military capabilities. For our purpose here, the intelligence difficulties 
encountered during the operation hinged on the structure and function of the various 
NATO elements and their interaction with the U.S., or dealt specifically with coalition 
intelligence sharing. The ‘capability gap’ identified first during Bosnia, and now 
reiterated during Kosovo, also became a theme for scholars, politicians, and NATO 
governments, which responded with the Defense Capabilities Initiative in 1999. 
The size of the operations in Kosovo exposed another key weakness in NATO 
intelligence support at the political-strategic level, which negatively affected the ability of 
the organization to respond effectively to operational developments. NATO intelligence 
at the political-strategic level was supported through the International Military Staff 
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(IMS). At the time, the IMS contained a small, by U.S. standards, intelligence division of 
25 officers, few of whom had prior experience in intelligence. The division’s mission was 
to support the political and military decision making process through the Military 
Committee and the North Atlantic Council. In addition to the paucity of intelligence 
experience, the staff, and NATO as a whole, had no organic collection resources and 
relied on information supplied by member countries. Additionally, the intelligence 
production process within NATO required that any official product must have the full 
consensus of all NATO members. The lack of collection resources and the consensus rule 
hampered the production of early baseline estimates on the problems within the former 
Yugoslavia.60 As the Alliance moved toward Operation Allied Force and national 
governments shared less with the Alliance in response to heavier internal intelligence 
demands, the NATO Intelligence Division could not accommodate the quickening pace 
of political-strategic change and instead had to focus on internal NATO developments 
and actions, which delivered an incomplete picture to NATO policy makers. By the end 
of the operation Admiral Guido Venturoni, the new head of the Military Committee, 
commented, “Indeed, without the United States’s [sic] assets the European Alliance 
members and Canada could never have mounted a successful air campaign such as this. 
Quite frankly, they simply do not have the capacity.”61 The admiral noted the 
requirement to acquire systems and capabilities that deal with the politically sensitive 
elements of the targeting process.  
NATO intelligence was overwhelmed by the number of ongoing tactical 
operations and lacked the technological ability to support a large, complex campaign. The 
U.S. gradually began to provide more intelligence support until finally the U.S. Task 
Force Anvil provided the majority of the targeting support and the U.S. Joint Analysis 
Center at RAF Molesworth, UK, functioned as the primary combat support agency for 
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intelligence.62 Thanks to its mature operational networks and capacity the U.S. met 95% 
of NATO intelligence requirements, which included over 22,000 intelligence products 
provided by JAC Molesworth to NATO.63 The shift toward U.S. dominance of 
intelligence support functions also revealed U.S. unfamiliarity with NATO procedures, 
and problems with U.S. integration. These problems reignited debates on target selection: 
whether to strike infrastructure targets that attacked Belgrade’s political will and ability 
to continue the offensive, or the equipment and weapons used against the Kosovars.64 
Dissemination practices also became problematic because American agencies tended to 
write products primarily for U.S. units at the highest classification available instead of 
writing for the widest NATO dissemination possible.65 As noted above, the U.S. had 
difficulties determining need-to-know in a coalition environment.66 Additionally, 
American access to a wide range of intelligence, especially ISR-related data, led other 
Allies to perceive the U.S. as arrogant, while U.S. personnel felt that they gave much 
more information than they received from other NATO members.  
Intelligence sharing was not just an American problem. Interviews conducted 
after OAF indicate that the French utilized tactical SIGINT intelligence collection sites in 
Macedonia, but that information never made it into NATO databases.67 Information flow 
was hampered among the Allies, and this was exacerbated by the tactical targeting 
approach required for the operation. Many of the targets were fleeting, and so required 
immediate identification, assessment, and kinetic action, which was beyond European 
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capabilities.68 Operation Allied Force clearly demonstrated that NATO European allies 
could not gather and disseminate information or intelligence in real-time, and as a result 
U.S. reliance on U.S. technological capabilities drove a wedge between American and 
European support doctrines.69 General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, highlighted these problems during the campaign: “Kosovo revealed a host of 
technical and training problems, shortcomings in the equipment of given allies, and the 
inability to create the kind of fusion of command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, battle management and strategic reconnaissance systems needed to fight 
with maximum effectiveness and interoperability.”70  
NATO’s reliance on the United States for the lion’s share of intelligence support 
also exposed difficulties with U.S. information sharing with the Allies outside the 
intelligence sphere. The advanced platforms and weapons employed by the U.S. 
prompted the Americans to strictly define releasability procedures for the Air Tasking 
Order (ATO). The ATO delineates aircraft takeoff times and locations as well as assigned 
target areas. The U.S. was reluctant to disseminate information on the operations of its B-
2 and F-117 stealth aircraft as well as the employment of the Tomahawk Land-Attack 
Cruise Missile (TLAM). The dissemination of two ATOs, one U.S. only and another for 
NATO as a whole, created great confusion for NATO radar operators as U.S. assets 
appeared with no warning.71 Additionally, the U.S. restricted the dissemination of Battle 
Damage Assessments (BDA), which inhibited the ability of NATO planners to assess the 
need for restrikes and probably caused the unnecessary re-targeting of Serb targets by 
Allied aircraft.72 These restrictions were perhaps the result of U.S. distrust in Allied 
personnel security qualifications and requirements in light of the arrest of a French 
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officer who passed targeting information to the Belgrade government.73 Additionally, 
there were suspicions within the SACEUR staff that Greek nationals were also passing 
information to Belgrade officials.74  
The picture presented by many after action reports is that Alliance intelligence 
sharing is complex and difficult. At the tactical and operational level units involved in 
KFOR, the ground peacekeeping element, exchanged intelligence so that the cooperation 
was defined as ‘good.’75 Nevertheless, there were substantive recommendations made to 
remedy the problems identified. Within the realm of intelligence sharing, both the United 
Kingdom and France focused on ensuring access to complete operational information for 
members of the coalition; in practical terms this meant Europeans having access to 
American intelligence.76 Many organizations expected the NATO Defense Capabilities 
Initiative, which began in 1999, to plot a way forward. As early as 1996, the NAC 
appointed a High Level Steering Group which directed members toward increasing 
European intelligence capabilities and forcing NATO planners toward a joint construct so 
information would flow seamlessly to all member nations from NATO institutions and 
vice versa.77 This proposal included exercises that focused on political consultation and 
coalition building so the targeting process could incorporate the full political context of 
sensitive targets, which necessarily depend on the incorporation of comprehensive 
intelligence.78 Similarly, Admiral Venturoni recommended the acquisition of intelligence 
platforms and systems to deal with the political issues that accompany coalition 
warfare.79 The DoD in its official After Action Report to Congress noted the requirement 
to study how coalition allies receive information and how the information flow can 
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maximize data fusion at facilities like NATO’s CAOC.80 Reflecting back on his 
experiences in Kosovo, General Wesley Clark noted the need to bolster intelligence 
capabilities NATO-wide 
because the fundamental basis of managing any crisis has to be a common 
perception of what the crisis entails and what an acceptable strategy would 
be in dealing with it, I think it’s important to strengthen intelligence-
sharing within NATO. In the Kosovo operation, the majority of the 
intelligence came from the United States. We need a much broader-based 
intelligence process, and other nations need to contribute more to the 
common intelligence picture. That way we can build on that picture 
rapidly in an emergency.”81  
It is clear that the intelligence capabilities of non-U.S. NATO Allies could not 
provide the necessary information to conduct the campaign. Considering the technical 
and procedural gaps in the Canadian and the European militaries, assistance had to come 
from the United States. This was the second time since the end of the Cold War that the 
U.S. had to provide the majority of intelligence support to NATO operations. Despite the 
lessons identified after the Bosnia campaign, NATO member countries, including the 
United States, refused to reform the NATO organization to deal with what General Clark 
called the “fundamental basis of managing any crisis.”82 This refusal left the most 
capable member of NATO, the U.S., with the responsibility to share in order to meet 
operational requirements. The rebuilding and refortifying of NATO intelligence by the 
U.S. during the Kosovo campaign indicates that the Alliance never fully implemented 
any post-Bosnia intelligence reforms. Instead, the Allies chose to pursue a strategy that 
required European political mobilization to support the addition of European capabilities 
to the Alliance without much serious thought to building on the costs already incurred 
during Operation Allied Force.  
Despite the substantive recommendations from member countries noted above, 
NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative report contained more bombast than practical 
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commitment toward expanding NATO capabilities. During a NATO seminar in May 
2001 outgoing U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow concluded that “rhetoric 
has far outpaced action when it comes to enhancing capabilities,” and gave the alliance a 
“failing grade.”83  
D. NATO AND AFGHANISTAN  
September 11, 2001, changed American national security priorities. The scale and 
dramatic fashion of the attack shocked the Western world. Less than twenty-four hours 
after the attacks, as a show of solidarity toward the United States, the Allies invoked the 
mutual defense principle of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. On October 2, 2001, U.S. 
Ambassador Frank Taylor briefed the NAC on the results of Washington’s investigation 
and upcoming plans for the invasion of Afghanistan. On October 7, 2001, the U.S. began 
striking Taliban targets. Over the next six months U.S. operations, in concert with limited 
coalition and local support, swept and cleared much of the country. Despite the Article 5 
declaration, the U.S. never called on NATO to discuss the use of its military forces for 
assistance. There were three potential reasons for the U.S. not to request NATO 
assistance in Afghanistan: 1) The invasion force would have required a vote of 
consensus, which the U.S. might not have been able to muster; 2) the time required to 
incorporate European forces would have pushed the American timeline too far to the 
right; 3) European forces, to a large extent, would have likely depended on American 
support capabilities, including logistics, force protection, and intelligence, thus increasing 
the initial U.S. footprint to an even greater extent.  
The U.N. assumed responsibility for the rebuilding of Afghanistan and during the 
initial years individual NATO countries took command of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) on a rotational basis. NATO’s transition toward the leadership 
of ISAF first began as support to German and Dutch ISAF commanders, which 
eventually led to NATO taking full responsibility for the mission in August 2003. Inside 
the country, NATO, supported in many ways by the United States, has established an 
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array of intelligence support functions that have largely been the result of ISAF’s 
evolutionary command structure since 2003. 
Despite these impressive gains, some military leaders have noted significant 
problems with the U.S. and Allied approach. First, it focuses too much on highly 
classified technical intelligence and is not adapted toward peacekeeping or stability 
operations. In 2010, General Michael Flynn and his coauthors noted the U.S. military 
intelligence community’s inability to take on the cultural intelligence duties required to 
combat the Taliban insurgency.84 Second, despite 10 years of conflict the U.S. and 
NATO as a whole still have difficulty sharing intelligence and information. The report of 
a DoD Inspector General investigation states:  
Impediments to intelligence information sharing between U.S. force and 
coalition partners have existed for years. However, the impediments 
continue to include: inadequate information sharing training; outdated 
foreign disclosure policies and procedures; and the absence of a source 
registry for coalition forces to de-conflict counterintelligence and human 
intelligence source data. This has resulted in information not being 
tactically useful by the time it is authorized for release.85  
1. A NEW NATO INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE – THE NIFC  
This thesis argues that although NATO and the United States will always continue 
to provide limited intelligence to suit the current operational needs, the Alliance lacks 
investment in a comprehensive intelligence support mechanism to support independent 
NATO major operations. To this end, this section briefly examines the NATO 
intelligence support mechanisms that exist today and then reviews the outcome of the 
intelligence support to operations in Libya in 2011. It is important to note that the sharing 
mechanism established in Bosnia, and then rebuilt for operations in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan (with limited success) had to be reestablished for Libya. Despite the addition 
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of new U.S.-funded operational intelligence organizations and changes in NATO 
functions, investment within NATO organizations for intelligence continues to fall short.  
The response to many of the interoperability challenges identified by the Bosnia 
and Kosovo after action reports was the U.S.-led creation of the NATO Intelligence 
Fusion Centre (NIFC). The center grew out of the commitments laid out during the 
Prague Summit of 2002.86 The declaration from the Summit encouraged states to 
improve intelligence capabilities, but makes no mention of a specific course of action. A 
Canadian Forces history of the NIFC indicates that NATO military heads met in 2003 
and proposed the organization because they “recognized…a shortfall in the intelligence 
process within the alliance.”87 As the framework nation, the U.S. provided the majority 
of funding during the construction phase and still continues to offset the operating costs. 
SACEUR acting under his EUCOM role saw the project to completion. According to two 
senior officers serving in EUCOM at the time of NIFC’s creation, the organization served 
several practical functions: long term investment in non-U.S. NATO personnel to ease 
the U.S. intelligence burden, the correction of missteps made in the Balkans during the 
1990s, the ability to incorporate and align different levels of intelligence input from new 
member states, and as a means to capitalize on the momentum of intelligence practices 
for ongoing operations in Afghanistan.88  
E. OVERVIEW OF EVENTS AND OPERATIONS IN LIBYA 2011 
The organization created out of the lessons identified during previous NATO 
missions found its first real test during Operation Unified Protector (OUP), and 
unfortunately it failed to bridge NATO’s intelligence capabilities gap. Upswells of social 
unrest in the Middle East and North Africa created the conditions for the toppling of 
governments during the ‘Arab Spring’ movements of 2011. In Libya, forceful protests 
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began around February 17, 2011, with the so-called ‘Day of Rage,’ which dissenters 
staged around various cities in the country. Libyan security forces moved in and killed 
several protesters. Eventually, the cities of Misratah and Benghazi became the 
headquarters for the various movements that opposed Muammar al-Gadhafi’s regime. In 
an effort to crush the rebellion, Gadhafi deployed his most loyal military units to take 
Misratah and then move toward Benghazi. With the humanitarian crisis increasing and 
civilian casualties mounting in Misratah, the United Nations Security Council approved 
resolution 1970, which called for an immediate end to the violence and imposed an arms 
embargo and sanctions on the Libyan regime. In light of the continuing hostilities, the 
U.N. approved UNSCR 1973 on March 17, 2011, which authorized the imposition of a 
no-fly zone over Libyan territory as part of a broader package designed to ensure the 
protection of civilians. Coordinated strikes by U.S., French, British, and Italian assets 
began on March 19 under the U.S. rubric, Operation Odyssey Dawn.89 Using attack 
aircraft and a number of standoff weapons, including Tomahawk missiles, the coalition 
disabled the Libyan air defense network and set the conditions for NATO to assume 
command of the operation.  
The U.S. transferred responsibility for Libyan operations to NATO on March 31, 
2011, and the Allies began Operation Unified Protector. After destroying or disabling 
Gadhafi forces that were threatening the civilian population, the Alliance provided 
material and close air support to Libyan Transitional National Council forces that moved 
toward Tripoli. Gadhafi eventually fled the capital, and after some time at his fortified 
hometown of Sirte, the former leader was killed on October 20, 2011 while trying to flee 
yet again. Unified Protector officially ended on October 31, 2011, after more than 26,500 
sorties and 5,900 targets destroyed along with substantial maritime operations in support 
of the arms embargo and humanitarian relief.90  
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1. NATO INTELLIGENCE DIFFICULTIES IN LIBYA AND U.S. 
SHARING  
Operation Unified Protector (OUP) was a complex mission that required 
comprehensive political and military support. Despite some members’ partial support, the 
operation was considered a success.91 Several militaries even “punched well above their 
weight class” in terms of the application and continuity of strike operations. OUP relied 
on a number of factors for its success, which included preparation of the battlespace by 
the Odyssey Dawn operations to enforce a no-fly zone, and a significant number of 
special force units to train rebels and enhance their capabilities.  
Many of the country and organizational after action reports for OUP are not yet 
public, but commentary by U.S. public officials points to a continued gap in NATO 
intelligence capabilities. Evidence of this occurred during the operation itself as U.S. 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates made “NATO’s serious capability gaps and other 
institutional shortcomings laid bare by the Libya operation” one of the themes of his last 
policy speech as the SECDEF at a NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting in Brussels. Gates 
emphasized the success of the Libya operation, but also cited the number of U.S. 
personnel required to augment the facilities at the NATO CAOC in Poggio Renatico as 
evidence that NATO European Allies were not living up to their commitments.92 Further 
indications of American dissatisfaction with NATO capabilities appeared in Foreign 
Affairs as the current U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daadler, and the then-SACEUR, 
Admiral James Stavridis, cited the same augmentation requirements as Secretary Gates, 
but also noted that 75% of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) data 
was supplied by the U.S.93 Their focus on ISR is warranted because, despite the 
operation’s small size and short duration when compared to Kosovo and Afghanistan, 
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OUP relied on ISR more heavily than previous NATO operations because of the 
requirement to fully identify the target and minimize collateral damage in light of 
NATO’s mission to protect the civilian populace. Despite the U.S. not committing its full 
complement of available combat resources, including an American aircraft carrier 
operating in the Red Sea, the United States still had to make up for the paucity of NATO 
assets and processing capability.  
F. CONCLUSION 
NATO’s inability to support modern combat operations is well documented. This 
stems from the politicized debates over intelligence estimates during the Cold War and 
the apparent failure to invest in an operational intelligence capability during the transition 
to a NATO expeditionary force. These decisions became the foundation for NATO’s 
post-Cold War structure and perpetuated intelligence capability gaps during the era of 
modern combined and joint warfare. The willingness of the U.S. to supplement NATO 
intelligence with both assets and information during the Balkans crises ensured Allied 
success, but prolonged the intelligence capability problem for NATO and created a crisis-
sharing mentality that dominated American intelligence-sharing strategy, if there ever 
was such a thing.  
For NATO, the creation of the NIFC in 2006 was a step in the right direction, but 
the NIFC still lacks the capability to support the full range of NATO military operations 
as demonstrated by the Libya campaign. The period of investment whereby NATO 
intelligence could have grown naturally with the rest of the organization’s abilities passed 
in the 1990s. Without huge additions of infrastructure and personnel, it is unlikely that 
NATO intelligence will be able to support major Allied operations. Furthermore, the U.S. 
has provided intelligence support assets in past NATO operations that may not be 
available during the next NATO conflict. With defense budgets shrinking and the U.S. 
strategic pivot to the Pacific, both the U.S. and its NATO allies must consider the 
development of an independent support capability. One method to bolster NATO 
intelligence capabilities is through a broadening and deepening of the intelligence sharing 
arrangements between the United States and the other Allies. This would both prepare 
NATO for the next conflict and engender a greater degree of reliability and trust between 
the United States and its NATO partners.  
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III. AN ENDURING “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP”: UKUSA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The idea of an Anglo-American special relationship first appeared during Winston 
Churchill’s address to Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, in 1946:    
Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world 
organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal 
association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special 
relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the 
United States…Fraternal association requires not only the growing 
friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred 
systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship 
between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential 
dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions, and to the 
interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges.94  
Little could Churchill have known, that very day representatives from both the 
United Kingdom and the United States signed a signals intelligence-sharing agreement, 
which marked the establishment in peacetime intelligence-sharing.95 It was the broadest 
and deepest intelligence sharing cooperative that had existed up to 1946 and it is arguably 
the most intimate connection that exists today. This new “special relationship” was, in 
fact, not merely based on common language and heritage, but was a series of small 
moves that enabled trust to replace suspicion. This process and these agreements provide 
a powerful guide to the establishment of a “special relationship” with NATO. Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT) cooperation was one of the first formalized transitions to U.S.–
U.K. “special relationship” and it emerged as the result of a crisis of cooperation that 
established the framework for reliable and predictable intelligence interactions. Similar 
cooperation move between the U.S. intelligence community and NATO could create the 
conditions necessary for a competent and capable military power and reliable foreign 
policy partners.   
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This chapter will explore the formation of the U.S.–U.K. signals intelligence 
relationship to identify the qualities that created an enduring and fruitful exchange, which 
became the cornerstone for the special relationship. First, we will explore the adversarial 
views of American foreign policy and military planners in the 1930s, which demonstrated 
the suspicion that had to be overcome to make cooperation successful. Second, we will 
briefly review the history of Anglo-American signals intelligence cooperation from 1940 
until late 1942 when an incident involving the British cryptologist Alan Turing would 
highlight the fragmented and uneven nature of the sharing relationship. Next, Turing 
incident’s aftermath facilitated the formation of the Britain-United States signals 
agreement. Here, the elements of cooperation led to the development of peacetime 
intelligence exchange through the UKUSA signals intelligence agreement. In the fourth 
section we will briefly explore the results of that cooperation from the 1950s to today. 
Finally, this chapter will identify the principles of the UKUSA intelligence agreement as 
they played out during the agreement’s formulation and execution.  
B. U.S. WAR PLANNING 1920-1941 
The international arena remained precariously balanced after World War I. The 
Treaty of Versailles was both a stunning achievement and conspicuously flawed. The 
creation of the League of Nations as part of the Treaty was a significant step toward 
establishing an international system of stability and order that could rectify perennial 
European problems over nationalism and territory. It and later the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
reinforced the notion that war was an unacceptable solution for the new international 
system. The treaty’s ineffective enforcement mechanism and the inclusion of tremendous 
war reparations along with the German war-guilt cause, however, laid the foundation for 
significant friction. The U.S. Senate, fearing the establishment of entangling alliances and 
the effect a collective security pact might have on their constitutional ability to declare 
war, rejected Versailles and the League of Nations. The U.S. retreated toward modified 
isolationism that enabled the participation, but not action, in international affairs. As a 
result, American military power atrophied and emphasis shifted to war planning as a 
means to test theories and map future requirements.  
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During the 1920s and 1930s, American military planners in the War and Navy 
Departments developed at least 23 different color-coded war plans.96 Based on potential 
threats, priority was given to war contingencies against Japan, War Plan “Orange,” and 
Britain, War Plan “Red.” In the Orange scenario, aggressive Japanese foreign policy 
focused on economic expansionism coupled with the increasing influence of military 
action as an adjunct to the island nation’s approach. According to military planners, this 
policy would begin to conflict with U.S. interests in China and threatened potential U.S. 
outposts in the Philippines and S.E. Asia.97   
Similarly, the U.S. perception of British desires to continue their empire 
necessitated the development of plan Red in 1930. While the initial planning for Orange 
was based on hypotheticals and speculation, War Plan Red played on historical, albeit 
low-level, enmity between America and Britain. U.S. military officers considered U.S.–
U.K. military cooperation during World War I an aberration and viewed Britain as 
especially aggressive in the maintenance of its commercial empire.98 Naval planners 
could easily envision a scenario where U.S. and British spheres of influence caused 
enough friction to start a war. A Naval War College analysis of the Washington Naval 
Conference in 1922 cemented feelings of competition between American and British 
Navies because, while the British and U.S. enjoyed parity in numbers of capital ships and 
tonnage, British firepower and armor were far superior to that of the United States.99 The 
stalemate at the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927 led Captain Frank Schofield, head of 
Naval War Plans Division to conclude that the British were holding on to a decisive 
advantage in naval warfare.100  Army planners, on the other hand, feared the British 
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would use Canada as a staging point for an attack.101 In the event of war, American plans 
should focus on severing British lines of communication with North America with a 
follow-on offensive to the north by U.S. ground forces.102 Fear of a coalition war also 
dominated military thought at this time during the preparation of the Red-Orange plans, 
which assumed a military alliance against the U.S. by both Britain and Japan with 
possible help from Mexico.103 Notably, after 1928 the Army directed much of the 
planning effort for Red while the Navy concentrated on Plan Orange.104  
The Japanese offensives on Mainland China and the ascent of Hitler as dictator in 
1938 forced planners toward a more refined view of possible British aggression. Most 
naval planners viewed Britain as either neutral or a potential ally, while the army 
continued to emphasize the threat of invasion from Canada as a likely contingency.105 
Considering the potential for wars in the both the Atlantic and Pacific, the Navy began to 
focus on leveraging Britain as a possible ally that could hold the Atlantic area while U.S. 
forces focused on the Pacific. By 1936, Army policy toward the status of the U.K. was 
torn between those who recognized war with Britain was unlikely and those who insisted 
on planning for it anyway.106 The conflict over Army policy was representative of an 
ideological struggle of isolationism vs. internationalism that was already prevalent in 
American society.107  
Until 1936 Britain was still viewed as a competitor and while that mindset had 
evolved by 1939, American support for British interests was never a foregone conclusion. 
The German invasion of Poland in the fall of 1939 never prompted automatic American 
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support for the subsequent British and French declaration of war on the Nazi state. Staff 
officers in the War and Navy departments feared that military support to Europe would 
drain the resources needed in the event of American military build up.108 The U.S. only 
finally met with the French and British officers in 1940 to discuss full cooperation, and 
despite the ongoing Battle of Britain Army and Navy leadership continued to oppose 
significant aid for Churchill and the British. Some officers were reluctant because they 
thought Britain was on the brink of defeat and any aid delivered into the country now 
would only fall into German hands later.109  
In October 1940, Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark prepared a strategic 
planning memorandum that tied U.S. interests directly to the European balance of power 
scheme. In the event of U.S. entry into the war, the plan called for support to the United 
Kingdom toward a Germany first strategy that relied on assuring victory in the Atlantic 
while taking a defensive posture in the Pacific. Stark’s memo, Plan Dog, was accepted at 
the highest levels of government because it clearly established principles for victory 
based on strategic plans that explicitly favored U.S. not British interests.110 The 
distribution of the plan was followed by a U.S. – British conference from January – 
March of 1941 that focused on the formulation of joint strategy if the U.S. entered the 
war. The ABC-1 conference document followed the propositions laid out in Plan Dog, 
but the U.S. delegation constantly fended off what they viewed as British attempts to 
capitalize on U.S. participation in the furtherance of the Empire.111  
 Suspicions over British strategic concerns continued well into 1941 during the 
Atlantic Conference and were likely only overcome through the close alignment of 
American and British political leadership during the Atlantic Conference in August of 
that year. Both Roosevelt and Churchill committed to “make known certain common 
principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their 
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hopes for a better future for the world.”112 This declaration was released to the world on 
August 14, 1941, forcing American military leaders toward greater cooperation with their 
British counterparts.113  
From 1922 until the very eve of U.S. entry into World War II, American military 
suspicion over British war aims clouded diplomatic and military cooperation. The 
American military establishment feared the United Kingdom, who appeared to have 
greater unity and better foreign policy coordination, would dominate the direction of the 
alliance. The U.S. felt that the influence of British imperial holdings abroad would dilute 
or skew allied strategy toward British interests, which might place the U.S. in a more 
precarious strategic position and prolong the war itself. American fears must have 
seemed well founded as the British advocated for a strategy that focused on attacking the 
German periphery in North Africa instead of the European continent while they repeated 
requests for U.S. assistance to British forces trying to hold Singapore in the Far East.  
C. THE BEGINNING OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 
Thus, Anglo-American signals intelligence cooperation began during a period of 
mistrust and suspicion.  During this period, the Government Code and Cipher School 
(GC&CS), headquartered at Bletchely Park, coordinated British signals intelligence.114 
Early attempts at American coordination, however, first came in 1940 from the British 
Security Coordination (BSC), a covert Security Intelligence Service (SIS or MI-6) office 
that operated out of New York City. Focused on counter-intelligence operations, the BSC 
cultivated relationships with the FBI and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
for American domestic issues while pursuing connections with Army and Navy signals 
organizations and the newly formed OSS.115 These attempts by the BSC revealed how 
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badly the U.S. intelligence structure was fragmented. Unlike the British organization, 
there was no single organization that coordinated domestic or foreign SIGINT. Army and 
Navy efforts were also disjointed with the Army attacking Japanese Army and diplomatic 
intercepts while the Navy focused on the Japanese Navy. These messages were 
deciphered and then sent to their respective departments with little or no crosstalk.116 Not 
only was American and British coordination uneven, but American internal policies also 
prevented full disclosure to other agencies. Despite the military environment and U.S. 
intelligence community disarray, episodic coordination on intelligence with Britain did 
occur prior to U.S. entry into the war.  
The efforts at establishing a cooperative framework began in 1940 after initial 
Anglo-American staff talks for coordinated planning. On July 8, 1940, Lord Lothian, 
British Ambassador to the United States, proposed a secret technical exchange to 
President Roosevelt that would provide Britain access to ultra short wave radio 
technology in exchange for information on the United Kingdom’s “method of detecting 
the approach of enemy aircraft at considerable distances, which has proved so 
successful.”117 Subsequent to the acceptance of this memo, General George V. Strong, 
the U.S. Army’s head intelligence officer (Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 
G-2), was appointed as the Army coordinator for this exchange. General Strong, in 
tandem with Rear Admiral Robert Ghourmley, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, 
was dispatched to London for the talks. During sessions with his British counterparts, 
Strong revealed that the U.S. was already decrypting Japanese diplomatic and military 
cables, codenamed “Purple,” and he offered to share this technology. This offer was a 
shock to the Navy, who did not want to reveal this capability especially since the British 
had offered nothing in return and they believed the technology behind the “Purple” 
machine would compromise U.S. codes and systems.118  
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Nevertheless, an exchange moved forward in the hope that cooperation with the 
British would give the U.S. access to foreign tactical and operational traffic not available 
through U.S. sources and might illuminate any German or Italian designs on Latin 
America and the Panama Canal.119 In December of 1940 two junior officers, Army 
Captain Abraham Sinkov and Lieutenant Leo Rosen, delivered the Purple machine to the 
British over the protests of the Navy Department.120 The two spent several weeks in 
Britain exchanging notes with the cryptanalysts there. They also learned about British 
success in cracking German diplomatic and military field traffic, codenamed “Enigma,” 
and the products named “Ultra.” 121 
Intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. appeared coordinated, 
reasonable, and highly active, but the appearance of cooperation hid real dissatisfaction in 
the way signals intelligence was handled. Much of this was the result of a fragmented 
U.S. intelligence effort. The Army Signals Intelligence Service relied on British support 
to decrypt some German intelligence, which was delivered to Washington, and even had 
some analysts at Bletchely Park working with GC&CS, but they were not granted access 
to the German Enigma decryptions122. After December 11, 1941, when Germany 
declared war on the U.S., the Navy was quick to attack the Engima problem because of 
the direct danger to U.S. naval ships. Noting the danger to Allied shipping, the British 
had previously supplied Engima traffic that might affect the transatlantic convoys. In 
February 1942, however, the addition of a fourth wheel to the German naval cipher ended 
the high fidelity intelligence delivered to the U.S. Navy.123 By October 1942, the U.S. 
Navy had devoted considerable effort toward solving the Enigma problem and during a 
technical exchange that month, the British reluctantly agreed to limited exploitation of 
the Enigma material to help protect the Atlantic convoy from German U-boat attacks. 
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Named for U.S. Navy Captain Carl Holden, the Holden Agreement of 1942 solidified the 
British recognition of “U.S. desire to attack submarine and Naval problems.”124 In June 
1943, the Navy began decoding Enigma material with tacit British consent.125  
D. THE TURING INCIDENT 
Despite some advances in cooperation during 1942 for both the Army and the 
Navy, the progress was fragmented and uneven because of the disjointed structure of the 
military intelligence community, British sensitivity over the Enigma decryption outside 
of the U.K., and continued American military reluctance to engage in British Imperial 
conquests. American dissent on the non-dissemination of signals intelligence climaxed 
during Operation Torch in late 1942. Both Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and 
Chief of the British Staff Mission to Washington, Field Marshal John Dill, felt that Allied 
forces operating in North Africa under General Eisenhower were taking unexplained, 
unwarranted, and unilateral actions based on Enigma material to which they had no 
access.126 This provided additional tinder for a spark that would ignite a review of the 
U.S.–U.K. SIGINT relationship.  
The problems hidden by the episodic sharing noted above surfaced in December 
1942. As part of the secret technical exchanges that had been occurring since the Lothian 
memorandum of July 1940, Alan Turing, a leading cryptanalyst at Bletchley Park, filed a 
request to visit Bell Labs to review their progress on the U.S. Army’s attempt at creating 
new, high-speed analyzers for Enigma decryption.127 Considering the technological 
revelations that would accompany such a review, the request, filed through a relatively 
junior officer in the Army’s Military Intelligence Department (MID), was serious enough 
                                                
124 Benson, Communications Intelligence During World War II, 61; As quoted from the Holden 
Agreement of 1942 (not available). 
125 Howe, American Signal Intelligence, 119. 
126 Bradley Smith, The Ultra-Magic Deals and The Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940-1946 
(Novato, CA: 1993), 134. 
127 Howe, American Signal Intelligence, 120. This new analyzer used distinct fusing which differed 
from the Navy’s mechanical system for decryption.  
 46 
to warrant further review. Turing’s application was denied outright, and so the scientist 
appealed to Field Marshal Dill for help to gain access to the new device.128  
Dill corresponded with Army Chief of Staff Marshall to lobby on Turing’s behalf. 
Marshall, in turn, sought the advice of his G-2, General Strong, who previously offered 
unparalleled coordination with the U.K. General Strong, suspicious of British attempts to 
gain access to U.S. technology, warned against “backdoor” efforts to compromise 
American technology. In his response to Dill, General Marshall stated that this equipment 
was restricted to the “ultra secret category” and that “there is not interchange concerning 
these ultra secret developments.”129 Clearly this was a reference to the British 
classification system used for Enigma material and indirectly indicated a tit-for-tat policy 
on the exchange of material and technology. 
On December 15, 1942, Field Marshall Dill assured Marshall:  
I was horrified when I learnt that we were not giving you all our ultra 
secret developments in this field and took action accordingly. I am now 
told that we hide nothing from your duly authenticated people and even 
keep them informed of projected developments. If any of your people still 
have any doubts about this, I hope you will let me know.130 
A flurry of correspondence among the Army staff ensued whereby they attempted 
to consolidate their position with regard to disclosure of new information and outline the 
interactions with their British counterparts. After briefly reviewing the British delegations 
reasons for Dr. Turing’s access, the American position was summarized by Colonel 
Carter Clarke of the Army’s Special (Cryptographic) Branch, subordinate to General 
Strong: “In my opinion, this is merely another attempt to gain technical information on 
our secret cipher machines and ultra secret scrambling device...” Further, the British have 
failed to provide “German clandestine traffic, the German Army Field traffic, 
cryptographic material derived from Slavic nations, or the details of their high speed 
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analyzer.”131 After several exchanges and further research from both sides, Field Marshal 
Dill explained, “Our position, I understand, has been made quite clear. We are prepared 
to show your people everything in England [emphasis in original], but we reserve the 
right to refuse to all “exploitation” in the U.S. of vitally secret traffic where we are 
chiefly concerned, unless we are satisfied as to the necessity.”132  
Initially, the American military was driven toward cooperation with the British by 
President Roosevelt and the realization that in a two front war, Europe and the Pacific, 
that the U.S. needed military allies. By early 1943, the Americans realized the value of 
the Enigma material, but had no access to it without the British. For their part, the British 
cooperated on this specific issue to maintain the military and technical alliance already 
established.  
Despite two years of close cooperation between Allies from 1940-1942, however, 
the established patterns of sharing never produced enough trust to overcome doubt about 
the other’s intentions. The partners failed to formulate a coherent sharing strategy that 
reduced uncertainty and covered the areas necessary for strategic cooperation. At the 
operational level in North Africa, the potential failure of the Allied campaign helped the 
British to overcome their security concerns, which facilitated sharing of the Enigma 
messages with General Eisenhower and his staff, so clearly the British made exceptions 
to policy just as Field Marshal Dill stated. The lack of any significant mechanisms to 
ensure security while establishing patterns of reliable interaction between the Allies 
heightened the fear of intelligence compromise and defection. In this sense, defection was 
the notion that the U.S. or U.K. would use the intelligence relationship to gain some form 
of leverage and either break from the common strategic direction already forged by the 
political leadership or use it as an advantage in the post-war environment. Additionally, 
the U.S. failure to consolidate its signals intelligence structure, which was itself the result 
of competing military departments, was also to blame as London could reach agreements 
with some parts of Washington, through the Navy’s Holden Agreement, but not find 
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consensus with the Army G-2. This forced the British to deal with multiple agencies and 
likely allowed them to secure an overall more favorable position to their cause because 
they could form relationships with individual American organizations based on their 
needs without full consent of the U.S. government.  
E. A NEW FORMULA FOR SIGINT COOPERATION 
By January 9, 1943, however, Acting Chief of Staff for the Army General 
McNarney granted Dr. Turing access to the device and reiterated Field Marshal Dill’s 
emphasis on the value of full reciprocity between the two allies.133 One month later 
another potential crisis in intelligence relations surfaced as the Army Signal Intelligence 
Service (SIS) revealed that they had solved the Enigma problem and created their own 
decryption machines, making exploitation possible in the U.S. They also realized that 
successful exploitation of the code would require significant British assistance. An 
internal memo written on February 8, 1943, by the head of communications research for 
the SIS, William Friedman, noted the special procedures and special information required 
for the operation of the machines and that developing these, “would take several 
years.”134 Friedman advocated strengthening the U.S.–U.K. relationship with regards to 
the Enigma material and outlined specific arguments that might advance the SIS cause.135 
Formal requests for this information and support were delivered to the GCCS 
representative in Washington and Field Marshall Dill. The issue here was beyond Dill’s 
scope of responsibilities, but the British Chiefs of Staff in London provided a response 
that formalized the definitions of signals intelligence and the Enigma material while 
imposing exploitation responsibilities. This was the first effort to establish an intelligence 
relationship that encompassed the entire scope of American and British interactions:  
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The intention is to cover all matters connected with SPECIAL [Enigma 
related intelligence] and “Y” Intelligence [intercepted radio signals], 
Interception, Cryptography, and Security, from the decoding of Axis 
messages in their highest grade cyphers down to the extractions of 
Intelligence from plain message telephony transmitted from aircraft and 
field stations. We feel sure that the American “Y” Services will welcome 
this suggestion as it must be as difficult for their officers to deal with ours 
as for ours with them and they are, as we know, as anxious about security 
as we are.136 
For the next three months proposals and counterproposals flew back and forth 
from the U.S. and the U.K. At the outset, the differences in schemes placed the partners 
far apart in terms of organizational goals: the British wanted security and accountability 
while the Americans wanted total independence.137 In April and May 1943, delegations 
of experienced intelligence officials from both sides traveled to gain further insight on the 
other’s organizations. The U.S. vowed to refine their organization and the British began 
to accept the idea of full reciprocity of information and exploitation methods toward a 
common cause.138  
The two sides came to an agreement drafted on May 17, 1943, and implemented 
by the U.S. on June 15. Known un-poetically as “The Agreement between British 
Government Code and Cipher School and U.S. War Department in regard to certain 
‘Special Intelligence,’” it covered many of the points each side requested. The 
exploitation scheme remained favorable to Britain and the main organization for the 
Enigma intelligence while the U.S. received training, personnel, and raw material for the 
development of its own Enigma capability. The agreement did not cover the diplomatic 
or commercial channels for enemy nations nor did it discuss neutral countries.139  
It was this agreement, and to a lesser extent the Holden Agreement of 1942, that 
formalized full reciprocity for exchange between the two countries, established common 
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security principles for their programs and codified the language used to decrease 
organizational confusion. Forged during war, the parties pledged to share the methods of 
detection, identification, and exploitation of all Axis military services, including the 
German intelligence services.140 Furthermore, the document establishes the serious 
nature of the information and highlights the special handling measures required for 
intelligence transmission as well as the restricted access to program material by 
designated officers and the limited ability field commanders had to take action based 
solely on Special Intelligence.141 The agreement also included a simple list of terms used 
by the signals intelligence organizations to identify Special and “Y” Intelligence.142 
These elements were critical in establishing a common framework for conceptualizing 
intelligence exchange. 
It would be a stretch to believe that signals intelligence-sharing from this point 
forward operated smoothly, but that was not the intent of this agreement. The purpose 
was to provide a framework to reduce organizational and personal uncertainty on the use 
and handling of intelligence once the relationship was established. It was not meant to 
mitigate the effects of state or government actions. Under this framework, intelligence-
sharing could continue despite sour diplomatic relations. Just as easily, though, the state 
could use this agreement to end intelligence cooperation. The war was the impetus for the 
allies to work together and this agreement facilitated dialogue and increased the ability 
for each side to predict the other’s reactions as well as give the bureaucrats/officers 
involved in this process a common understanding as those officers served as the 
functional gatekeepers for cooperation. Over time, this created the conditions for 
intelligence-sharing between the U.S. and the U.K. on multiple levels from strategic to 
personal for specific functions or because of an assumed convergence of interests.    
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F. THE EFFECT OF THE AGREEMENT 
The agreement was successful enough at facilitating cooperation that a new, more 
comprehensive arrangement, known as Britain–U.S.A (BRUSA) was reached on March 
5, 1946 to monitor the growing tensions between the West and the Soviet Union. BRUSA 
was modified throughout the late 1940s and well into the 1950s to enable the addition of 
critical “second parties” to the agreement, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, while 
specifying dissemination and security regulations. The robust nature of BRUSA even 
facilitated the addition of 15 additional “third parties.”143  These second and third parties 
did not enjoy the same level of reciprocity between the U.S. and the U.K., but their 
inclusion is noteworthy. The amended agreements as a whole are typically referred to as 
the UKUSA, which centered on the U.S. providing technical resources and capability, 
while the British Empire provided collection sites to inaccessible collection targets inside 
the Soviet Union.144 The agreement marked an unprecedented peacetime sharing 
relationship between two previous competitors and several sources cite the UKUSA 
agreement as the “cornerstone” or “pillar” of the special relationship.145 Of critical 
significance here is the adaptation of a bilateral intelligence cooperative into a 
multilateral intelligence exchange.  
While the initial intelligence-sharing relationship was first enacted to combat the 
Nazi threat, the post-war UKUSA agreements focused on strategic warning in the event 
of Soviet attack. Shared intelligence, however, did not ensure a smooth relationship even 
in the shadow of an existential threat and the formation of the NATO alliance. In 1956, 
for instance, the failure of the U.S. to support a British/French/Israeli attempt to seize the 
Suez Canal led to a temporary halt in intelligence exchange.146 State actions were not the 
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only threat as the notorious Cambridge Five, a Soviet spy ring recruited during the 1930s 
1950s and early 1960s, was uncovered over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. The Five 
had risen through the ranks of the British Secret Intelligence Service during World War II 
and were exposed to American secrets through the close U.S.–U.K. relationship. Despite 
those difficulties the relationship endured. 
The continuity of the relationship, which weathered the turbulence of the 1950s 
and the decline of British defense resources in the 1960s during the retreat to east of the 
Suez, continued to play a vital role in assured access for the U.S. and brought exploited 
intelligence to the U.K. This became evident during the Falklands War in 1982 when, 
because of the lack of British assets to collect and exploit information from Argentina, 
the U.S. provided ninety-eight per cent of critical signals intelligence.147 After the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the UKUSA “magnitude [of cooperation] flared 
to an unprecedented brilliance within hours.”148 In 2003 the early support of the United 
Kingdom for intervention in Iraq was also arguably the result of the enduring intelligence 
relationship since the 1940s. While the initial conclusions of the intelligence might have 
been flawed, the British support for this U.S. policy demonstrated the strength of the 
intelligence bond. In summarizing the U.S.—U.K. special relationship on intelligence 
issues, a 2009 United Kingdom House of Commons special commission stated: “We 
conclude that, despite some recent frictions, the field of intelligence cooperation is one of 
the areas where the UK-US relationship can rightly be described as ‘special’. We further 
conclude that there can be no doubt that both the UK and US derive considerable benefits 
from this co-operation, especially in relation to counterterrorism.”149 
G.  CONCLUSION 
Relations between the U.S. and U.K. during the 1920s and 1930s were somewhat 
less than friendly. After cooperation in World War I they were the only nations with 
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significant military power still intact. Responding to this situation, American military 
planners prepared a series of war plans that painted Great Britain as a potentially 
dangerous enemy. Their naval power was second to none, they maintained a large 
standing army, and could call on support from their colonies to provide support in the 
event of conflict. The United States had every reason to be suspicious of Britain’s 
intentions.  
As events played out during the 1930s, this view began to slowly shift. By 1939-
1940 Britain was perceived as a potentially powerful ally. Limited cooperation ensued, 
but the Americans were still wary of British commercial interests outweighing U.S. 
strategic concerns. In 1941, cooperation was underway in earnest and this facilitated the 
sharing of significant signals exploitation capability. The limited agreements reached and 
uneven cooperation created concerns over the amount and type of material exchanged, 
particularly as the Allies kicked off the offensive phases of the war during Operation 
Torch. American dissatisfaction with this situation culminated in the response to Turing’s 
request to view sensitive U.S. intelligence developments in late 1942. The outcome of 
this incident, along with the increasing competency of American intelligence capability, 
was the Holden Agreement of 1942 and, more significantly, the signals intelligence 
exchange agreement reached in May 1943. The reciprocal nature of the agreement along 
with the enactment of specific terms and guidelines provided a framework for 
intelligence-sharing so that the partners could eventually broaden its scope and deepen its 
sensitivity. This provided an opportunity to build a “special relationship” with each other 
and extend some of that “specialness” to second and third parties.  
This model provides a potent example for the U.S.-NATO intelligence 
relationship as it stands now. The previous chapter examined NATO intelligence 
capabilities since the Cold War. Each conflict that NATO participated in found those 
capabilities wanting. In each case the American intelligence establishment provided 
additional operational support. This thesis argues in the concluding chapter that a 
broadening and deepening of the U.S.–NATO intelligence relationship is possible 
through the mechanisms found in the U.S.–U.K. relationship, and is necessary to build a 
more effective foreign policy partner. 
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This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that NATO’s intelligence support has 
significant problems, but these problems can be addressed through increased sharing by 
the American intelligence community. Considering the recent U.S. strategic pivot to Asia 
and current defense-spending constraints, this policy also provides a means to build an 
independent NATO intelligence support capability in the event of a major NATO 
operation while U.S. assets are involved in operations in the Far East. The agreements 
reached on U.S.–U.K. signals intelligence cooperation during and after World War II 
offer a lesson on the implementation of broad intelligence exchange even between 
untrusting partners. The implementation of such a regime–that is, exchange based on full 
reciprocity in specific areas–could provide more reliable and effective security and 
foreign policy partners. 
B. SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS CHAPTERS 
Chapter II briefly examined the history of NATO intelligence and traced the lack 
of an operational intelligence mechanism to Alliance burden-shifting debates. In the early 
years of the alliance, intelligence estimates were critical for establishing NATO force 
levels in Europe and for the development of NATO strategy. These estimates became a 
tool in the internal NATO political struggle as European nations attempted to ensure the 
integrity of European collective defense. As these intelligence estimates were politicized, 
the Alliance was reticent to establish an intelligence organization at the operational level. 
As the Alliance transitioned to a post-Cold War expeditionary environment, the gap in 
NATO intelligence capabilities became more evident.  
The paucity of NATO intelligence support was obvious during operations in the 
Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. During each of these conflicts NATO success hinged, 
in many ways, on American intelligence support. Comprehensive American intelligence 
support was initiated only during these conflicts, which established a fragmented and 
uneven sharing relationship with NATO and perpetuated the Allies lack of investment in 
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a NATO operational intelligence support capability. The transition to expeditionary 
operations in the early 1990s should have been accompanied by immediate investment in 
operational intelligence support. The failure of NATO, as a whole, has today resulted in 
the inability for NATO intelligence to support major operations. The United States must 
continue to bolster NATO intelligence through a broad program of exchange to build an 
independent NATO capability. Building comprehensive sharing between the U.S. 
intelligence community and NATO is critical when considering the potential military and 
foreign policy convergence possibilities as demonstrated by the U.S.–U.K. special 
relationship.  
Chapter III looked to U.S.–U.K. signals intelligence cooperation during World 
War II as an example for the formulation of intelligence exchange between competitors 
or untrusting partners which demonstrate the potential gain intelligence-sharing can bring 
despite significant impediments. The contingency war plans developed in the 1920s and 
1930s for a potential war with Britain demonstrated the degree that the U.S.–U.K. 
relationship, from an American perspective, centered on competition or rivalry. Military 
cooperation between the two was only initiated after Britain was at war with Germany 
and then against the advice of the top military officers. These were the same men 
responsible for the U.S. intelligence effort. In 1940–1941, President Roosevelt provided 
the political impetus for cooperation despite these institutional and personal barriers. The 
fractured and uneven nature of early attempts at intelligence cooperation nearly sunk the 
entire enterprise. It was only after cracks in the sharing relationship were revealed by 
British cryptologist Alan Turing’s request to see a U.S. scrambling device in December 
1942 that cooperation could be rebuilt to establish a system of reliability based on 
established common terms and a security verification regime. Codified in the May 1943 
agreement between the War Department and the Government Code and Cipher School, 
that system of reliability facilitated a series of predictable intelligence-sharing 
interactions that, over time, established broad sharing during peacetime as the foundation 
of the “special relationship.”  The creation of such a “special relationship” with NATO is 
in our national interests so that the U.S. has greater flexibility in deploying its elements of 
national power.  
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C. REASONS FOR CREATING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 
Broadening and deepening the U.S. intelligence community’s relationship with 
NATO follows strategic guidance from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. In the National Security Strategy of 2010, President Obama highlights the 
tenets of a successful American engagement strategy, which in part depends on our 
intelligence agencies’ cooperation with foreign governments “to anticipate events, 
respond to crises, and provide safety and security.” He in fact further posits, “We are 
strengthening our partnerships with foreign intelligence services and sustaining strong 
ties with our close allies.”150 Regarding NATO specifically, Former Secretary of Defense 
Bill Gates in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance asserts, “The United States has 
enduring interests in supporting peace and prosperity in Europe as well as bolstering the 
strength and vitality of NATO, which is critical to the security of Europe and beyond. 
Most European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it.”151 
Critically, the 2011 National Military Strategy identifies that “NATO members act as a 
stabilizing force on its perimeter, which ranges from the Middle East and the Levant, 
Northern Africa, the Balkans, and the Caucasus.”152 Taken individually, these concepts 
could justify increased intelligence-sharing with NATO, but together they represent a 
position of consensus that the United States should deepen its intelligence relationship 
with NATO as a means to develop partner capacity and reliability.  
D. INTELLIGENCE-SHARING THEORY: BUILDING AN ANARCHIC 
INSTITUTION  
The system of reliable interaction facilitated by the 1943 agreement and solidified 
during the peacetime Britain—U.S.A. Communications Agreement in March 1946, 
demonstrates the theories of intelligence sharing advocated by James Walsh and Adam 
Svendsen. Walsh posits that the cost of monitoring (e.g., determining if the other side 
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abides by restrictions in the use of shared intelligence) means that sharing must promise 
large potential gains if it is to take place.153 Clearly here he means that both sides must 
possess a compelling reason for sharing because the nature of secret institutions means 
that one state will not have insight as to the actions of the second state once information 
has been transferred. There is an understood potential for defection or misuse of secret 
information by cooperative states. Secondly, Walsh asserts “states share intelligence 
through anarchic institutions if they believe their partners are unlikely to defect.”154 
Anarchic institutions are understood to mean broad intelligence-sharing relationships 
whereby the partners do not monitor individual transactions, but establish common 
principles for exchange. Individual agency takes a role here so that low and mid-level 
managers are responsible for moving intelligence across state borders. Provided the 
organization has not established negative bureaucratic incentives for intelligence 
exchange, managers act in good faith as the gatekeeper’s of intelligence.155 As opposed 
to the hierarchical relationships established in Walsh’s other models, sharing through 
“anarchic institutions” has the potential to reap more rewards for both sides because this 
type of sharing facilitates a greater amount of intelligence exchange and may, if 
intelligence influences policy in both countries, facilitate the confluence of foreign policy 
between two states. This framework of sharing through anarchic institutions is the 
mechanism by which U.S.–U.K. operates and what the U.S. must transition to in its 
relationship with NATO.   
In his book Walsh focuses more on the hierarchical and verification relations 
created to guard against defection instead of fully explaining this anarchic 
institutionalism. Svendsen, while avoiding a connection with Walsh’s terminology, 
provides a description of how this type of relationship operates. For the U.S.–U.K. 
relationship in particular, he capitalizes on the work of Alex Danchev and John Baylis 
who assert there are three schools of thought covering this relationship: evangelical, 
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functional, and terminal.156 According to Danchev and Baylis, these schools provide the 
basis for the “special relationship,” which focus on the emotional ties behind the 
relationship, the specific purposes for the relationship, or the deceptive dimension of 
control inside the relationship.157 Svendsen applies those schools of thought across eight 
levels of relations from broad to narrow: ideological, theoretical, strategy, policy, 
operational, tactical, individual (professional), personal. In these dynamics, Svendsen 
describes the “anarchic institution” intelligence sharing portrayed by Walsh. 
Critically, and despite the multiple motivations, levels, and actors presented inside 
Svendsen’s description, he emphasizes that intelligence sharing should not be part of 
“crisis management.” This approach undermines risk management and constantly places 
the sharing relationship in a reactive mode.158 Rather, professionalized intelligence 
cooperation enables the strategic management of intelligence resources through broad 
spectrum sharing with enough detail so that intelligence remains effective.159 In other 
words, sharing intelligence only when needed, during crisis, cannot build an anarchic 
institutional-type relationship that creates the special dynamic enjoyed by the U.S. and 
the U.K.   
The 1943 agreement for U.S.–U.K. signals intelligence cooperation established 
the foundation for the anarchic institution method of exchange, which had far reaching 
benefits for both the United States and the United Kingdom during the Cold War and 
post-Cold War eras. Intelligence exchanges between the U.S. intelligence community and 
NATO, however, are best described as part of Svendsen’s “crisis management” scenario. 
This became clear as the intelligence exchange mechanisms between the U.S. and NATO 
required constant reconstruction during each major NATO operation throughout the 
1990s and well into the twenty-first century.  
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E. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current state of intelligence-sharing with NATO is untenable, while the 
benefits of a strong U.S. foreign policy and security partner in Europe with the capability 
to deploy are necessary to ensure security on the periphery of Europe, the Levant, and the 
Middle East. Further, limited U.S. equipment and personnel resources, if dedicated to 
operations in the Pacific Ocean, will not be available for NATO’s use; thus, making the 
temporary bolstering of NATO capabilities impossible. By permanently increasing the 
intelligence-sharing effort between the U.S. intelligence community and NATO, the 
European Allies may become less dependent on U.S. capabilities. Intelligence cannot 
replace physical capabilities, but intelligence can produce more efficient operations, 
which eases the need for the employment of equipment and personnel. For instance, 
intelligence cannot replace air-to-air refueling, but accurate intelligence can lower the 
number of sorties required for reconnaissance or strike, thus lowering the need for air-to-
air refueling capabilities.  
Enacting the terms of a 1943 style agreement with NATO is possible. The goal 
for the creation of such a pact should be to work toward anarchic institutional sharing 
established through a system of reliability that relies on common terms and a verification 
regime that facilitates predictable interactions among mid-level officers. Leveraging these 
gatekeepers is the key to creating a culture of sharing with NATO that focuses on 
military intelligence. In terms of complete reciprocity, the good news is that the U.S. 
already enjoys all the benefits of NATO intelligence. As a founding member of the 
Alliance we have clear insight into the organization and can lobby for changes in 
intelligence security procedures, if necessary. As noted earlier, however, the other NATO 
Allies do not have clear insight into American intelligence agency processes, procedures, 
and production. 
One method for ensuring greater clarity between partners is the appointment of a 
U.S. intelligence agency to act as the executive agent in establishing a closer partnership 
with NATO intelligence. As NATO is primarily a military alliance, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) is best placed to carry out this function. The Secretary of 
Defense should give DIA a broad mandate to increase the breadth and quality of material 
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produced for NATO. In order to stimulate the sort of multi-level, multi-motivational 
sharing envisioned by Svendsen in his model of U.S.–U.K. relations; DIA should adopt a 
policy of rotating personnel directly to the NATO staffs and the NATO Intelligence 
Fusion Centre (NIFC). Furthermore, DIA should offer NATO intelligence professionals 
exchange opportunities to work in the DIA cell that supports NATO operations, policy, 
and contingency planning. Leveraging its relationship with the Joint Operations and 
Intelligence Center Europe (JIOCEUR), DIA should change JIOCEUR’s mandate for 
support to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) as its primary mission. 
Secondary to this is support to Commander, European Command (EUCOM).160 As both 
positions are held by a U.S. four-star admiral or general this slight change appears 
inconsequential, but this would also pressurize JIOCEUR to support NATO as its 
primary mission, producing material to the U.S. EUCOM staff only on an as-needed 
basis, a stark reversal from the current formula. 
The NIFC is an organization established under a Memorandum of Understanding, 
paid for by the United States. This organization is best placed to become the operational 
intelligence hub for NATO and should be fully incorporated in the integrated military 
structure with formalized duties to support upper echelon NATO staffs as well as NATO 
component commanders. The current configuration for the NIFC delineates support to the 
SACEUR for the NATO Response Force (NRF) and Combined-Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
operations, but does not, technically speaking operate under the Allied Command 
Operations (ACO).161 Integrating the NIFC places an operational military intelligence 
organization in the heart of the integrated military structure on the same level as the 
newly inaugurated Joint Headquarters components in Brunssum, Netherlands, and 
Naples, Italy.  
Signals intelligence itself has become a fundamental capability for any competent 
organization. NATO’s ability to collect, process, and exploit signals intelligence is weak. 
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U.S. signals intelligence sharing policy with NATO is weak as well. Using the NIFC as a 
point of departure, the U.S. should sponsor a small MOU signals intelligence 
organization inside the Intelligence Fusion Centre. The National Security Agency in its 
Cryptologic Security Service role to the military is the natural agency to lead such an 
organization. The proliferation of mobile communication devices such as cell phones, 
smart phones, and tablet devices along with advancements in wireless computing 
networks make these types of intelligence sources valuable to the development of 
independent NATO capabilities. These technologies are expanding at an exponential rate 
and, as a global leader in signals intelligence, the National Security Agency has an 
opportunity to help shape NATO policy in this regard.  
The United States faces some severe budget gaps between what national strategy 
calls for and what the U.S. military can provide. From an international standpoint, NATO 
has certainly become what Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called “an exporter 
of security.” While the U.S. does not want to disengage from this framework, the fiscal 
constraints of a global presence require that we balance our force structure toward areas 
of potential instability. American dedication to the transatlantic alliance remains firm and 
one of the principal mechanisms for ensuring and expanding that commitment is through 
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